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## FCO 8/2125

1973 Jan 01 - 1973 Dec 31

### **Visit of Prince Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz, Commander of Saudi Arabian National Guard, to UK, 4-10 July 1973**

#### Description

This file relates to a visit to the UK by Commander of the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG) Prince Abdulla Bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud, as an official guest of HMG to mark improved relations. It contains correspondence and records of meetings concerning:

- Arrangements for his arrival, reception, and itinerary (including military equipment demonstrations)
- The names and titles of his entourage
- Proposed specialist training for a new special operations unit by Diversified Corporate Services Limited
- Talks with the Acting Chief of the General Staff about the question of training explosive detection teams for the protection of the Trans-Arabian Pipeline
- Points of protocol, preference, and personality to bear in mind for future visits by Prince Abdulla, including his avoidance of hot spicy food

This file also contains a personality note on Prince Abdulla and briefs for the visit on:

- Defence relations
- The British military mission to SANG; and the future of Brigadier Adrian Donaldson, head of the mission

- Iranian ideas for defence cooperation in the Gulf
- The Saudi Arabian Armed Forces
- Assistance in the training of specialist explosive detection teams
- The general internal and external political background
- Defence sales, including reference to armoured vehicles and rapier and vigilant missiles

This file also contains correspondence relating to:

- Praise for the Ministry of Defence's handling of the visit
- A proposed visit by Prince Sultan Bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud

## Related links

### Entities

- [Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf](#)
- [Saudi Arabian National Guard](#)
- [Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company](#)

### Personalities

- [Abdulla Bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud](#)
- [Adrian Donaldson](#)
- [Peter Carington](#)
- [Robert Alexander Lindsay](#)
- [Sultan Bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud](#)

### Places

- [Abu Dhabi](#)
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- [Arms and military equipment](#)
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## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 03**

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RABAT

3 August 1973

F D Robins Esa NENAD TCO

IT OF PRINCE ABDULLAH BIN ABDULAZIZ

Prince Abdullah bin Abdelaziz, the brother of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, spent a week privately in Morocco from 20 to 27 July. The purpose was simply to have a holiday although he was met by the Minister of the Interior and a bevy of officials. He seems to have spent most of his time at Mohammedia near Casablanca but he travelled south with the King's brother, Prince Moulay Abdullah, to join King Hassan in Agadir for the Moroccan Cup Final and the opening of the Youssef ben Tashline Dam. He was therefore in Agadir during the Summit Meeting held between the King and the Presidents of Algeria and Mauritania.

2. The Saudi Chargé d'Affaires told us that originally he intended to bring his family and rent two villas but he was dissuaded when told that any visit here would be treated at least semi-officially by the Moroccans. He added that apart from welcoming the Prince on arrival, he had only seen him on one other occasion.

S Cotton

c.c. Chancery Jedda.

LAST PAPE?

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 04**

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3/7

29 July 1973

R M Hunt Esq Middle East Dept FO

VISIT OF PRINCE ABDULLAH BIN ABDULAZIZ

1. I was puzzled by the reference in paragraph 3 of the Record of Conversation between Lord Balniel and Prince Abdullah on 4 July to assistance reaching the rebels in Dhofar in an indirect way from certain of the Gulf Emirates. Prince Abdullah made a similar statement to Mr Gilmour during their meeting at the Ministry of Defence on 5 July from which the inference was drawn that Abu Dhabi was the villain.

2. The only collateral that we have is that in May the Oman Intelligence Service received a report from Palace sources that Shaikh Zaid had donated 30,000 dinars to PFLOAG. We suspect however that the Palace received their report from Saudi sources but in the absence of most of the Palace staff at present we have no means of checking on this. If the information did indeed come from the Saudis we would of course regard it with caution.

TJ Clark

Copied to:

Chanceries at

JEDDA KUWAIT ABU DHABI DOHA TEHRAN

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## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 05**

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office London SW1

Telephone 01 -

Your reference

Our reference

Captain E W Briggs RN Protocol Department Room 8334 Ministry of Defence Main Building, SW1

NBS 26/6 17 July 1973

Date

### **VISIT OF PRINCE ABDULLAH OF SAUDI ARABIA**

1. You may be interested to read the attached letter from our Chargé in Jedda about the recent visit to the United Kingdom of Prince Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz. I had already written to Walker before receiving his letter to say that the visit seemed to us to have been most successful.

2. I would like to echo his remarks about the exemplary way in which all sections of the Ministry of Defence and the three services handled this visit with the assistance of the Government Hospitality Fund. Both the Saudi Ambassador and Prince Abdullah himself commented on the success of the visit, and I have no doubt that it will have given a further fillip to Anglo-Saudi relations. I hope that it may also have resulted in some positive defence sales.

3. I am sending a copy of this letter and a copy of the enclosure to Willie Paterson in GHF.

P R H Wright Middle East Department

W J M Paterson Esq CMG Government Hospitality Fund

CONFIDENTIAL

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 06**

CONFIDENTIAL

Jedda 68/13

14 July 1973

VISIT TO UK OF PRINCE ABDULLAH BIN ABDUL AZIZ

I

Z

1. I wonder whether we shall be getting a letter from you Saying amongst other things that Prince Abdullah's visit to the UK was a pain (it was certainly hard work fixing it up at this end); I expect we shall.

2. Against that event I am writing to say that we were full of admiration for the way the Ministry of Defence arranged an excellent programme at short notice (our telegram no 285 of 23 June), and that at least the visit secured us some useful publicity in the press here.

3. I imagine the Prince himself is now in Beirut or some where, so it may be some time before we at this end are able to do any kind of debriefing.

erh

HB Walker

CONFIDENTIAL

**FCO 8/2125 | Page 07**

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WITH THE COMPLIMENTS OF THE

15/7 PRIVATE SECRETARY

MAIN BUILDING, WHITEHALL

LONDON, S.W.1

**FCO 8/2125 | Page 08**

v

Tehran MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Muscat MAIN BUILDING, WHITEHALL, LONDON, S.W.1



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NBS 2018

RECORD OF MEETING BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE  
AND HRH PRINCE ABDULLAH BIN ABDUL AZIZ

AT THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE ON THURSDAY 5th JULY 1973

Present :

Lord Carrington

Mr. A.P. Hockaday,

DUS (P) AVM F.R.L. Mellersh

ACDS (Ops) Mr. W.F. Mumford

PS/S. of s Mr. K.R. Tebbit

APS/S of s

HRH Prince Abdullah bin Abdul

Aziz, Commander Saudi Arabian

National Guard. HE Shaikh Abdul Aziz al Tuwaijiri,

Under Secretary of the National Guard for Financial & Administrative

Affairs HE Shaikh Abdul Rahman al Helaissi

Saudi Arabian Ambassador

Lt Gen Al Rashid, Military Commander,

National Guard.

Lt Col Bromage

Interpreter

After an exchange of the usual pleasantries, Lord Carrington asked for Prince Abdullah's views on the situation in Oman. The most disturbing impression which he had gained during his own visit in the Spring was that, with the exception of Saudi Arabia and Iran, the Arab nations were not interested in assisting Oman. Now things looked a little more hopeful with signs that Jordan, Libya and Abu Dhabi were more prepared to help. He found the Libyan case particularly interesting; Sultan Qaboos seemed to have persuaded Libya that Communism in the PDRY posed a greater threat to Libyan interests than did British policies and they were now prepared to act in concert with Britain and had promised financial aid. Prince Abdullah said he understood that there had been a slight improvement in the military situation in Oman in recent months. As regards assistance by other Arab countries he would only observe that it was firm help and not just promises that was needed. He had no knowledge of any financial contribution from Libya. Lord Carrington stressed the efforts which the British Government were making to persuade the Gulf States that it was in their own interest for them to help Oman's struggle in the Dhofar. Prince Abdullah agreed that this was the right approach: world Communism had its foothold in the PDRY and the threat extended not only to Oman and the Gulf, but to Saudi Arabia and all of her friends.

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2. Lord Carrington said that when he was in Riyadh there was an intelligence report of a possible military incursion by the PDRY into Saudi Arabia. The incident appeared to have petered out, but was there still a risk of an attack? Prince Abdullah replied that one Communist aircraft had taken off and, if it did not actually attack Saudi territory, it had set out with the intention of doing so. But PDRY had denied all knowledge of the incident and his country would not react until there was firm evidence of another act of aggression.

3. In response to a question about Saudi Arabia's relations with the Gulf States, Prince Abdullah said that there was a slight coming together of opinions, visions and outlooks. But closer harmony depended upon a speedy settlement of the dispute with the UAE. In his opinion King Feisal had given away more than he should have done with his proposal of 1970. But extremely generous as these terms were, Shaikh Zaid had still to give a substantive reply. It was now up to Shaikh Zaid to make a move to settle the dispute, for King Feisal could compromise no further. In Prince Abdullah's view the issue was of great importance since at present, although the UAE had Saudi Arabia's blessing, it did not have recognition by her, and this was necessary for the UAE'S future to be guaranteed. Lord Carrington agreed that it would be in the interests of all parties for these difficulties to be settled as soon as possible and said that, although Britain no longer had any locus standi in the matter, we were prepared to do what we could to help.

4. Continuing a tour d'horizon of the outlook in the Middle East, Prince Abdullah commented favourably on Iran. He described the Shah and his advisers as wise and pleasant men and believed that Iran had an important role to play in fostering Arab harmony. Being at one remove from the Arab nations themselves, Iran was in a perfect position to act as honest broker between them.

5. On Iraq, Prince Abdullah said that he agreed with the Shah of Iran's verdict. Russian involvement was very strong and effective, So much so that the Iraqi Government could not hold together without it. He saw no sign of a settlement of the border dispute between Iraq and Kuwait.

6. Lord Carrington asked for Prince Abdullah's opinion on the growing energy gap. If there was to be an energy crisis, international tension could mount as nations competed for oil. Was Saudi Arabia concerned about this? Prince Abdullah took the view that whether or not there was a crisis was largely a matter for the West. For their part Saudi Arabia thanked God that they were the ones with the oil. However,

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he stressed that they had no intention of profiteering or benefiting from the misfortunes of others.

7. In conclusion, Lord Carrington expressed the hope that Prince Abdullah would enjoy the demonstration which had been arranged for him of military equipment, particularly FOX, SCORPION and RAPIER. . He knew the Saudis had been interested in Saladin, but this was no longer produced and he could assure Prince Abdullah that its successor was a much better weapon. Prince Abdullah said he was grateful for the arrangements. When he had seen the British equipment he would be in a better position to compare it with what the French and Americans had to offer.

8. Lord Carrington then escorted Prince Abdullah to the Head of Sales's office for a more detailed discussion of defence equipment.

ki Secretary of State's Office 9th July 1973

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## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 11**

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office London SW

Telephone 01

Your reference

H B Walker Esq

Our reference NBS 26/8

JEDDA

Date

16 July 1973

VISIT OF PRINCE ABDULLAH TO THE UNITED KINGDOM 4-10 JULY

1. You will be receiving separately the records of Prince Abdullah's conversations with Lord Balniel, Lord Carrington and Mr Ian Gilmour during his recent visit. I am enclosing with this letter a copy of the printed programme for his visit, together with a copy of a note of his conversation with the Chief of Defence Staff and a minute by Patrick Bannerman recording some personal impressions of the visit,

2. We should naturally be interested to hear any reactions you learn about the visit, and in particular any points which you think should be borne in mind in planning the visit of Prince Sultan. On the whole Prince Abdullah's visit seems to us to have been success ful and worthwhile.

P R H Wright Middle East Department

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

Reference

Mr Tatham

VISIT OF PRINCE ABDULLAH

1. I attach a short letter to Mr Walker for Monday's bag.

2. Would you please ensure that the records of Lord Balniel: conversation, and the records of Prince Abdullah's talks with Lord Carrington and Mr Gilmour, have been sent to Jedda. I assume that there is a record of Mr Gilmour's talk, other than the minute prepared by Mr Bannerman? I do not think that the latter minute should be copied elsewhere. 13. Do we know whether the question of Brigadier Donaldson's 1 future was discussed substantively during the visit?

N.GO. 15. July 1973

P RH Wright

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Mr Wright MED

#### ITEMS OF INTERESTX ARISING DURING PRINCE ABDULLAH'S VISIT

I have recorded elsewhere the substance of Prince Abdullah's conversation with Lord Balniel on 4 July and of his conversation with Mr Gilmour on 5 July. The purpose of this minute is to record other matters of interest which were discussed on those occasions when I was present. There were three points which I consider should be brought to your notice.

Defence Sales 2. During lunch at the Royal School of Artillery at Larkhill, Prince Abdullah showed great interest in the new gun which the Army have developed, the 105 \* mm light gun. He asked for full details of performance, specification, price etc. Brigadier Purvis, who accompanied the Prince to Larkhill, agreed to provide all the necessary literature and he also agreed to organise a demonstration of the gun either in the UK or in Saudi Arabia. The Larkhill programme was altered so that the Prince could see the new gun together with the standard towing unit. Prince Abdullah also raised the question of the 105 with Brigadier Page at Sandhurst on 9 July and asked for the Brigadier's opinion. He remarked that it seemed to be a good gun, but was expensive. 3. My personal impression was that Prince Abdullah was keen to acquire the new gun for the National Guard, subject to Saudi Government approval and subject to his officers being satisfied that it was appropriate to the National Guard.

The Arab-Israel Dispute 4. This subject was discussed with Mr Gilmour on 5 July. Prince Abdullah also raised it at Sandhurst. The line he took was broadly that indicated in my separate minute of on his discussions with Mr Gilmour. x Buraimi

This was discussed by Prince Abdullah with Lord Balniel on 4 July. Prince Abdullah also mentioned it briefly when talking with Mr Gilmour and at Sandhurst. As I have already told you, both Lord Balniel and I consider that Prince Abdullah raised the question on instructions and was talking to a prepared brief.

JP Bannerman Middle East Section Research Department

10 July 1973

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LOOSE MINUTE

## VISIT OF PRINCE ABDULLAH, COMMANDER OF SAUDI NATIONAL GUARD

You may be interested to see the attached note of Prince Abdullah's recent meeting with the Chief of the Defence Staff.

M. R. PACK

MR PAOK DS13b MB 0213 Ext 6279 11 July 1973

## FCO 8/2125 | Page 16

CONFIDENTIAL

PS/S of s PS/Minister of State Sec/CNS MA/CGS PS/CAS PS/PUS PS/IDS PS/CE (PE)  
DMO MAO DUS (P) AUS (D Staff) AUS (Sales) SECCOS DS 11

## VISIT OF PRINCE ABDULLA, COMMANDER OF SALDI NATIONAL GUARD

1. During Acting CDS' talk with Prince Abdulla (which was pleasant and friendly), the only substantive matter discussed as the question of training Explosive Detection Teams for the protection of the Trans-Arabian Pipeline. In answer to a question from Major General Scotter (DMO), Prince Abdulla said that it would take too long for training to be carried out in UK. DNO explained our difficulties over the shortage of instructors which could be sent to Saudi Arabia and he seemed to accept this. He acknowledged the British Army's expertise in this field and expressed an interest in the specialist equipment which has been developed. He asked that a list of suitable equipment be sent to him before he leaves for Riyadh on Tuesday 10 July. DMO is taking the necessary action.

2. The situation in Oman was also discussed very briefly and the need to provide more aid to the Sultan was mentioned Prince Abdulla agreed, but stressed that it must be a joint effort,

3. Prince Abdulla mentioned the British Military Mission, and said that he was pleased with their performance and that of Brigadier Donaldson,

L W TOWNSEND Captain RN MA/CDS Ext: 2117

6 Jul 73

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MMISTRY OF DEFENCE

PS/MINISTER OF STATE MA/US OF S(ARMY) PAS/US OF S( RAF) PS/PUS Sec/CNS  
MA/CGS MA/VCDS PS/AMSO PS/DGI DUS(P) HDS ACDS(Ops) DMO AUS(D Staff)  
AUS (Sales) A/D Sales id DS 11 DS 13 SAASC (Lt-Col. Bromage) PROTOCOL OFFICER

VISIT OF PRINCE ABDULLAH, COMMANDER OF SAUDI

NATIONAL GUARD

The Secretary of State has asked that his appreciation be conveyed to all concerned with the arrangements for Prince Abdullah's visit to this country which has ended today. Lord Carrington was very pleased at the way everyone responded - often at considerable inconvenience - to meeting the needs of the programme for the Prince which had to be drawn up at such short notice. The visit appears to have been a success, and the Secretary of State is grateful that everyone involved has been so co-operative in completing the arrangements for this important visitor.

(M. DUNMORE) APS/SECRETARY OF STATE 930 7022 Ext: 2111/3

11th July, 1973.

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 18**

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE MINISTER OF STATE AND HRH  
PRINCE ABDULLAH BIN ABDUL AZIZ AT THE DORCHESTER HOTEL ON 4 JULY  
1973

Present: The Rt. Hon. Lord Balniel MP

HRH Prince Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz, Commander Saudi Arabian National Guard

Mr J P Bannerman (Interpreter)

HE Shaikh Abdul Aziz Al Tuwaijiri, Under-Secretary of the National Guard for Financial and Administrative Affairs

HE Shaikh Abdul Rahman Al Helaissi

Lord Balniel said that he was delighted to see Prince Abdullah particularly at a time when relations between Britain and Saudi Arabia were so good. Prince Abdullah said that the two countries

had been on good terms since the days of the late King Abdul Aziz and that King Faisal took a deep personal interest in maintaining and strengthening the ties between the two countries. Lord Balniel asked for Prince Abdullah's assessment of the situation in the countries bordering on Saudi Arabia. He said that HMG were fully aware of the serious implications for the area of the rebellion in Dhofar. Our latest information suggested that although the struggle would be long drawn out, the situation had improved. He thought that the Sultan was over the hump and referred particularly to the number of rebel adherents who had recently surrendered. This was encouraging. However, HMG recognized the importance of the Dhofar



situation for the area as a whole. It was necessary for everyone to assist the Sultan in his struggle.

Prince Abdullah said that according to recent reports in Saudi Arabia, assistance was reaching the rebels in Dhofar in an indirect way from certain of the Emirates in the Gulf. In response to a query, he confirmed that the reports stated that this indirect assistance was in some cases coming from the Governments of the

/Emirates

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## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 19**

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Emirates concerned. He did not specify which. Lord Balniel said that this was disturbing news. His own impression as a result of his visit to the Gulf area was that the Gulf Rulers had come to recognize the dangers to their own position of the Dhofar situation

and now appreciated the necessity of helping the Sultan. Lord

Bainiel thought there were two main dangers facing the area. These were the possible spread of subversion from Iraq in the north and from Dhofar and PDRY in the South. He had the impression that the Gulf Rulers appreciated this. 4 Prince Abdullah said that the only real danger was from Communism. Iraq and PDRY on their own were not important. What was important was that the Communists were attempting, with a fair degree of success, to control these two countries. This was the biggest threat to the area. There was therefore a need for all the states in the area to co-ordinate their policies and to co-operate in combatting the Communist threat. He did not think that the Gulf Rulers appreciated this. Lord Balniel agreed that the Communist

threat was real and important. However, the impression he had gained during his visit to the Gulf was that the Rulers did appreciate the dangers. It was very important at this stage that the Sultan of Oman was given as much assistance as possible and that there should be co-operation. 5 Prince Abdullah agreed. He said that Saudi Arabia was assisting the Sultan and that the Saudi Government were constantly considering how best to help the Sultan. He wondered what HMG were doing. Lord Balniel pointed out that Britain was a country with limited power and financial resources. Nevertheless, HMG recognized the importance of stability in the Gulf area and assistance was being given. There were, for example, the British officers in the UDF and

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 20**

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in SAF; Britain was giving the Sultan other help as well; there was also the recent successful negotiation over the Saudi Air Defence Scheme which showed that HMG considered a strong and stable Saudi Arabia the key to the stability of the Gulf. Prince Abdullah said that he wished to make Saudi Arabia's position clear. Saudi Arabia We admittedly a rich country. It was, however, a large country and

was underdeveloped. There was a great need for additional roads,

communications, hospitals, education facilities etc., all of which cost money. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia was doing a lot for the Sultan. He wished to stress the difference between the Saudi attitude and that of some of the Gulf States. Some of these states were very rich, but because they were small and had small populations, they had more money than they could profitably spend. But what were they doing to assist the Sultan? Prince Abdullah considered that every state in the area had a duty to assist the Sultan. He suggested that it was equally a duty for their friends to make the Gulf Rulers see the necessity of assisting the Sultan and he implied that HMG should be taking every opportunity to stress this point to the Gulf States.

Prince Abdullah went on to say that it was in the interests of everyone that the United Arab Emirates should co-operate with Saudi Arabia, should improve political relations with Saudi Arabia and should try to settle outstanding differences with Saudi Arabia. This was essential for the future safety and stability of the area. It was important that mutual friends should make this point very strongly to the Gulf Rulers and should do everything possible to ensure that the Gulf Rulers appreciated the point and did something practical about it. Lord Balniel agreed generally with Prince Abdullah's argument. He said that he had gained the impression that the Gulf Rulers and their subjects had come to respect Saudi Arabia and King

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 21**

Taisal and to look up to them for guidance and leadership. They appreciated the need for good relations with Saudi Arabia and for co-operation in the interests of the whole area. 7. Prince Abdullah said that he wished to stress again the importance to be attached to the efforts made by friends to persuade t Gulf Rulers of this proposition. No effort should be spared. In particular, there was a need for outstanding disputes with Saudi Arabia to be settled. The existence of these disputes was affecting everyone. He pointed out that King Faisal had made a very generous proposal in 1970 which Snaikh Zaid had accepted in principle but wished to study further.

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## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 22**

8 In conclusion, Lord Balniel thanked Prince Abdullah for his plain speaking. He was grateful for the exposition of Saudi thinking which he had found extremely valuable. He

would report the details of the conversation to the Secretary of State on the lujter's return from Helsinki.

Middle East Department 13 July 1973

cc: Mr Coles

Mr Parsons Mr Wright Chanceries: Jedda

Kuwait Abu Dhabi Dubai Bahrain Doha

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CONFIDENTIAL

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covering CONFIDENTIAL

42)

NBS 26

PRINCE ABDULLAH BIN ABDUL AZIZ

You asked about the visit of Prince Abdullah bin

Abdul Aziz in whose honour the Saudi Ambassador is holding

a reception this evening.

Prince Abdullah is Commander

of the Saudi National Guard, an internal security force

which is quite separate from the Saudi Armed Forces. The National Guard is advised by a British military mission

under Brigadier Adrian Donaldson.

2.

Prince Abdullah was invited to visit this country by

Lord Carrington when the latter visited Saudi Arabia in

April this year. Prince Abdullah's half-brother, Prince Sultan, the Saudi Minister of Defence, was also invited at the same time and is likely to visit the UK later this year. 3. I attach a copy of the programme arranged for Prince

Abdullah, together with a personality note on him.

PRH Wright Middle East Department

9 July 1973

covering CONFIDENTIAL

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 24**

HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN  
AND NORTHERN IRELAND

Visit of His Royal Highness Prince Abdulla bin Abdulaziz, Commander of the Saudi Arabian National Guard

4 to 10 JULY 1973

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 25**

His Royal Highness Prince Abdulla bin Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia will be accompanied by:  
His Exocly Shaikh Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Muhsin Al-Tuwaijiri,

Una Secretary of the National Guard for Financial and

Administrative Affairs Lieutenant-General Ibrahim Al-Rashid,

Military Commander of the National Guard Shaikh Khalid bin Muhammad bin Shalub,

Director of the Commander's Office for Financial and

Military Affairs Mr. Hamad bin Salih Al-Hamudi,

Director of the Commander's Office Captain Sultan bin Khalil,

Commander of the National Guard Special Security Unit First Lieutenant Faisal bin Abdul Muhsin Al-Furm,

Deputy Commander National Guard Police Unit Dr. Khalil Ahmad Tibu,

Personal Physician Ahmad bin Talib,

Personal Servant Mr. Abdul Rahman Al-Shatri,

Deputy Director of Public Relations for the National Guard Mr. Muhi Ibrahim Al-Maghrabi,

National Guard Photographer

In attendance: Lieutenant-Colonel T. N. Bromage, Grenadier Guards

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 26**

Programme

WEDNLJDAY, 4 JULY

1110 hrs

His Royal Highness will arrive at London (Heathrow) Airport, South Side, by Special Flight from Paris

Met by the Secretary of State for Defence, The Rt. Hon. Lord Carrington

Leave London Airport by car (for Dorchester Hotel if time allows)

(1230)

Depart Dorchester Hotel for Hyde Park Barracks, Knightsbridge, if time allows)

1245

Arrive Hyde Park Barracks, Knightsbridge

Met by Lieutenant-Colonel W. R. Edgedale, Life Guards, Commanding Officer, The Household Cavalry Regiment, and introduced to the officers

Luncheon

1315

to 1410

1415

Visit the Riding School Gallery, see full dress display in the Gymnasium, visit the Forge, visit the Life Guards and The Blues and Royals Squadrons

1530

Depart for the Dorchester Hotel

1630

The Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, The Rt. Hon. Lord Balniel, M.P., will call on His Royal Highness

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 27**

THURSDAY, 5 JULY (Contd.)

THURSDAY, 5 JULY

1100 hrs

Depart the Dorchester Hotel

1610 hrs\_Talks with the Head of Defence Sales, to

Sir Lester Suffield

1640

1115

Arrive Ministry of Defence Horse Guards Avenue

1645

Depart Ministry of Defence

1700

Arrive the Dorchester Hotel

Welcomed by the Secretary of State for Defence, The Rt. Hon. Lord Carrington and The Minister of State for Defence, The Rt. Hon. Ian Gilmour, M.P.

1955

Depart the Dorchester Hotel for Lancaster House

2000 for

2015

Received by a Guard of Honour provided by the 1st Battalion Welsh Guards with the Regimental Colour Corps of Drums and the Band of the Battalion

Dinner given by Her Majesty's Government Host: The Secretary of State for Defence,

The Rt. Hon. Lord Carrington Lancaster House, St. James's Dress: Black Tie or National Dress

Talks with the Minister of State for Defence, The Rt. Hon. Ian Gilmour, M.P.

Return to the Dorchester Hotel

1130

to 1235

1240

Depart the Ministry of Defence, Horse Guards Avenue Entrance, for Admiralty House

1245

for

Luncheon given by Her Majesty's Government Host: The Minister of State for Defence,

The Rt. Hon. Ian Gilmour, M.P. Admiralty House, Whitehall

1300

Depart Admiralty House and return to the Ministry of Defence

1430

to 1500

Talks with the Chief of the Naval Staff and First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Michael Pollock and the Director of Military Operations, Major-General W. N. R. Scotter

1505

Talks with the Secretary of State for Defence

1605

(Continued on next page)

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 28**

FRIDAY, 6 JULY

SATURDAY, 7 JULY

0950 hrs

Free

Depart the Dorchester Hotel, accompanied by Brigadier R. H. Purvis, Assistant Military Dept Head of Defence Sales

the

1020

Arrive Battersea Heliport

1030

Depart Battersea Heliport by Queen's Flight for the Royal School of Artillery, Larkhill, Wilts.

SUNDAY, 8 JULY

1115

Arrive Larkhill

Free

Met by the Commandant Royal School of Artillery, Brigadier K. J. McQueen

1130

to 1215

See demonstration of Fox and Scorpion given by the Acting Commandant Royal Armoured Corps Centre, Colonel J. R. Willis

1220

Fly by Queen's Flight to Royal Artillery Officers' Mess

Luncheon in the Royal Artillery Officers' Mess

1245

to 1400

1415

to 1530

Presentation on Rapier given by Colonel H. M. Garnett

1535

Depart by Queen's Flight for Battersea Heliport

1620

Arrive Battersea Heliport and return to the Dorchester Hotel



## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 29**

MONDAY, 9 JULY

TUESDAY, 10 JULY

0945 hrs

His Royal Highness departs, details to be announced

Depart the Dorchester Hotel accompanied by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Army, Mr. Peter Blaker, M.P.

1100

Arrive Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst Yorktown Gate

Met by Acting Commandant, Brigadier J. T. Page

Briefing in Arabic on the Royal Military Academy

Tour the Academy including a visit to the Assault Course

Luncheon

1240

to 1400

Further Tour of the Academy to see Cadets undergoing instruction, including a Weapon Display

1500

Depart for the Dorchester Hotel

1615

Arrive Dorchester Hotel

1800

Reception given by His Excellency the Saudi Arabian Ambassador Claridge's, Brook Street, W.1

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 30**

NOTES

NOTES

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 31**

NOTES

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 32**

PRINCE ABDULLAH BIN ABDUL AZIZ

Born 1921

One of the many sons of King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud the founder of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom: a half brother of King Feisal and Prince Sultan (the Minister of Defence).

Commander of the National Guard since February 1963.

He is the member of the Royal Family closest to the tribes. Abrupt, impulsive and a right-wing hard-liner but popular. He is regarded with considerable respect by the members of the British Military Mission attached to his headquarters.

A supporter of the Crown Prince Khalid. Probably personally ambitious and is likely to have a key-role in determining the succession to King Feisal but he seems more likely to work for a collective leadership than to set himself up as a contender for supreme power.

Enjoys hunting trips and horse-racing and is Chairman of the Riyadh Horse-Racing Club. Suffers from an impediment of speech. Does not speak English,

Middle East Department Foreign & Commonwealth Office LONDON SW1 July 1973

CONFIDENTIAL

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 33**

MED

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

5 July 1973

VISIT OF PRINCE ABDULLAH OF SAUDI ARABIA 1. As you may know Lord Balniel paid a courtesy call on Prince Abdullah yesterday afternoon. A number of points arose during the conversation which Lord Carrington and Mr Gilmour may wish to note before their meetings with Prince Abdullah today. I am therefore sending you with this letter the draft record of yesterday's conversation.

2. The first point raised by Prince Abdullah was the need for HMG to urge Gulf Rulers to help Oman. You will see that Lord Balniel told the Prince of his impression that the Gulf Rulers had come to recognise the dangers to their own position in the Dhofar situation and that they now appreciated the need to help the Sultan. I hope that your Ministers will agree to reiterate this line and to point out that it is largely through our promptings that Iran, Abu Dhabi and other Gulf States have provided such assistance to Oman as they have. We believe that Shaikh Khalifah bin Zaid's visit to Dhofar last month may result in further assistance from Abu Dhabi and we naturally hope that Saudi Arabia will continue to urge her friends in the Gulf to join us in helping Oman.

/Prince

Mr Mumford Private Secretary to Lord Carrington

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 34**

CONFIDENTIAL

3. Prince Abdullah's second point was that the Gulf governments themselves might be sending assistance to PFLOAG. We have seen no evidence of this at all and your Ministers might therefore wish to question Prince Abdullah more closely on this and to ask if we could be provided with the evidence for these reports.

4. Finally you will see that Prince Abdullah raised the familiar question of the Saudi/Abu Dhabi border dispute. On this we have consistently taken the line with the Saudis since 1971 that we no longer have any formal status in the question but that we have nevertheless often spoken to Shaikh Zaid about the dangers of leaving the border question unsolved. If, as is possible, Shaikh Zaid comes to Britain again this summer Ministers will certainly do what they can to encourage him to mend his fences with King Faisal. For your information we are most anxious not to become involved again in the details of this dispute.

5. I am copying this letter to Mr Gilmour's Private Secretary together with the enclosure.

A J Coles Private Secretary to Lord Balniel

CONFIDENTIAL

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 35**

CONFIDENTIAL

Registry

DRAFT

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

To:

FROM A J Coles Telephone No. Ext.

Top Secret. Secret. Confidential. Restricted. Unclassified.

Mr Mumford Private Secretary to Lord Carrington

Department

PRIVACY MARKING

...In Confidence

VISIT OF PRINCE ABDULLAH OF SAUDI ARABIA

Private Secretary to Mr Ian Gilmour

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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

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(17260) Dd.897459 400:n 12/72 G.W.B.Ltd. Gp.863 (16940) Dd.897300 400m 9/12  
G.W.B.Ltd. Gp.863

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join us in helping Oman.

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CONFIDENTIAL

/ Gulf

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 36**

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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

## FCO 8/2125 | Page 37

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

The Right Honourable Sir Alec Douglas-Home and Lady Douglas-Home thank His Excellency the Ambassador of Saudi Arabia for his kind

invitation to a reception on Monday, 9 July at 6-3.00 p.m. but much regret that they are unable to attend owing to a prior engagement.

4 July, 1973

/

## FCO 8/2125 | Page 38

In honour of H.R.H. Prince Abdulla bin Abdulaziz, Commander of the Saudi Arabian National Guard.

The Ambassador of Saudi Arabia ?

and Lady Douglas Home,

at a reception on Monday am july at 6-8 o'clock

at 4, Kensington Palace Gardens, W.8.

Ciridaes Ballroom entrance RSVP Private Secretary, Private Secretary, des c 27 Eaton Place, S.W.A.

## FCO 8/2125 | Page 39

Reference.

2.

(17293) Dd.897465 400m 1/73 G.W.B.Ltd. Gp.863

## FCO 8/2125 | Page 40

3. Lord

/ 7/

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## FCO 8/2125 | Page 41

PRINCE ABDULLAH BIN ABDUL AZIZ

Born 1922 One of the many sons of King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud the founder of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom: a half brother of King Feisal and Prince Sultan (the Minister of Defence). Commander of the National Guard since February 1963.

He is the member of the Royal Family closest to the tribes. Abrupt, impulsive and a right-wing hard-liner but popular. He is regarded with considerable respect by the members of the British Military Mission attached to his headquarters.

A supporter of the Crown Prince Khalid. Probably personally ambitious and is likely to have a key-role in determining the succession to King Feisal but he seems more likely to work for a collective leadership than to set himself up as a contender for supreme power.

Enjoys hunting trips and horse-racing and is Chairman of the Riyadh Horse-Racing Club.

Suffers from an impediment of speech. Does not speak English.

Middle East Department Foreign & Commonwealth Office LONDON SW1 July 1973

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## FCO 8/2125 | Page 42

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED REGISTRYNAS

Mr Coles

NB5208

VISIT OF HRH PRINCE ABDULLAH BIN ABDUL AZIZ: 4 - 10 JULY

1. Lord Balniel has kindly agreed to call on Prince Abdullah at the Dorchester Hotel on 4 July at 4.30pm. Mr Bannerman will attend as interpreter. 2. Prince Abdullah is unlikely to raise points of substance

but I attach a copy of the general political background brief

prepared for Lord Carrington and a personality note on

Prince Abdullah.

3. Prince Abdullah is Commander of the Saudi Arabian National

Guard, an internal security force which is quite separate from the Saudi armed forces. The National Guard is advised by a British Military Mission under Brigadier Adrian Donaldson. (If

Prince Abdullah raises the future of Brigadier Donaldson, Lord

Balnel may wish to say that this is a matter for the Ministry of Defence and Lord Carrington will discuss it with the Prince

during their talks on 5 July).

D E Tatham 2 July 1973

Middle East Department copies to: Mr Bannerman, Research Dept

Mr Weait, News Dept

CONFIDENTIAL

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 43**

Brief No.

VISIT OF PRINCE ABDULLAH BIN ABDUL AZIZ : JULY 1973

Political Background Brief

General

The outlook for Saudi Arabia is set fair. Increasing

revenues from oil have bolstered Saudi self-confidence at home and enhanced her political and economic position in the

Arab world.

Anglo/Saudi Relations 2. Britain and Saudi Arabia share many of the same interests

in the Middle East though there are underlying points of

friction. King Faisal still harbours resentment at our role in Palestine during the Mandate, our defence of Abu Dhabi during the Buraimi crisis in the 1950s, our handing over Aden

to the National Front in 1967 and what he regards as British

connivance at Iranian occupation of the Tunbs and Abu Musa

Islands in the Persian Gulf in December 1971. 3. There has however been a marked improvement in Anglo/ Saudi relations in the past year, helped by the improved



relations we both enjoy with Egypt, by our common interest  
in helping Oman and the Yemen Arab Republic resist subversion from Aden, and by

(i)

the successful negotiation of the government-to  
government agreement on the Saudi Arabian Air  
Defence Scheme; the Ministerial decision to sell Jaguar air

(ii)

craft to Saudi Arabia subject to certain  
conditions; and

-

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 44**

(iii) Lord Carrington's visit to the Kingdom in  
April 1973. This visit, the invitations to Princes Abdullah and Sultan to visit Britain  
and the frequent "semi-private" visits of  
Prince Fahd and other prominent Saudis to London  
have helped to consolidate the welcome upturn  
in Anglo/Saudi relations.

4. This year Saudi Arabia is our most important trading partner in the Arab world. British  
exports in 1972 amounted to £45.2m. There is however a strong trading balance in Saudi  
Arabia's favour because of our large imports of oil,

and we are examining ways of encouraging further British  
interest in this rapidly expanding market.

Saudi Foreign Relations

5.

Saudi Arabia's vastly increased wealth and more central  
position in the Arab world following Nasser's death have

improved her standing in the Middle East. We have been

urging the Saudi Government to assume the responsibilities

it is now more able to bear, particularly in the Arabian Peninsula where our basic objectives coincide. Saudi Arabia has begun to provide military and civil assistance to Oman, including helicopters for the Sultan of Oman's Air Force but we have been pressing the Saudi Government to increase its financial aid, both to Oman and the YAR.

Saudi relations with the Gulf States are mixed. She

has still not recognised the United Arab Emirates. Since

our withdrawal from the Gulf at the end of 1971 we have

/ avoided

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 45**

avoided involvement in the Saudi/Abu Dhabi border dispute, which is a running sore in the two countries bilateral

relations, and reflects a personal antipathy between King Faisal and Shaikh Zaid. But we continue to urge on both sides the need for reconciliation. Saudi Arabia enjoys good

relations with Qatar

Relations with Iraq are now very poor

and the Iraqis are conducting a press and radio campaign

against Saudi Arabia. Relations with Iran are good but not

close.

Arab/Israel

7.

King Faisal continues to be obsessed by what he describes

as the Zionist/Communist conspiracy but would probably agree

to whatever settlement the "confrontation" states could accept.

The Internal Scene

8.

The prestige and authority of the King remains strong  
and there is no obvious threat to the regime. His death is

unlikely to pose any immediate threat to the Royal Family: the Crown Prince Khalid may be expected to succeed to the throne and his half-brother Fahd to assume effective power. 9. Oil wealth is filtering slowly down the social scale.

There has been very considerable material development and

the main constraint on social progress is a shortage of trained manpower. Saudi Arabia remains a closed society with a repressive legal and administrative system. The long term danger to the regime lies in this contrast between economic dynamism and social immobility.

/Arms for the

-3

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CONFIDENTIAL

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 46**

Arms for the Yemen Arab Republic 10. The YAR, like Oman, is facing a growing military and subversive threat from the People's Democratic Republic of

Yemen. She is very short of modern weapons. She is also  
short of cash, and recently asked Qatar for money to buy  
arms.

11. Her Majesty's Government are ready to sell the YAR appropriate military equipment but the latter's exact

requirements are not yet known in any detail. 12. Our Ambassador in Jedda has recently learned that

King Faisal has agreed in principle to help the YAR. The Saudi Government are, he said, considering two schemes of

military assistance:

arms

(i) a short-term scheme for the immediate supply of

small arms and light equipment from existing Saudi sources; and (ii) a long-term scheme for the complete rebuilding of the YAR Armed Forces which would involve a sum of US \$1 billion if American equipment were bought or about half that sum if the equipment were bought from other Western sources. For these financial reasons, equipment for ground forces might well come from non-American sources but the aircraft chosen would probably be F5s (which Saudi Arabia already have).

13. None of this changes HMG's position which is that we are willing and anxious to help the YAR in whatever way we can. (There was, for example, the recent visit to North

/ Yemen

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 47**

Yemen by a British counter-subversion team at the request of the YAR Government.) We would certainly be interested in sales to their armed forces, if British equipment were preferred.

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 48**

POINTS TO MAKE

1.

Ministers are particularly pleased with the recent welcome improvement in Anglo/Saudi relations. 2. Our interests in the Arabian Peninsula coincide.

We welcome Saudi Arabia's active interest in preserving the integrity and stability of neighbouring states such as the YAR and Oman. We must keep in close touch and exchange views on these matters.

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 49**

PRINCE ABDULLAH BIN ABDUL AZIZ Born 1921

One of the many sons of King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud the founder of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom: a half brother of King, Feisal and Prince Sultan (the Minister of Defence).

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Middle East Department Foreign & Commonwealth Office LONDON SW1 July 1973

CONFIDENTIAL

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 50**

MISS BAZZARD

RECEPTION IN HONOUR OF PRINCE ABDULLAH: 9 JULY

Your minute of 2 July below to David Tatham.

2. Prince Abdullah is visiting the United Kingdom from 4-10 July at the invitation of Lord Carrington as an official guest of HMG. The Ministry of Defence have prepared a programme which includes talks with Lord Carrington and Mr Gilmour, the Minister of State for Defence. Lord Balniel will be calling on the Prince on 4 July.

3. The Prince's visit is a mark of the improved relations we now enjoy with Saudi Arabia and we are anxious that it should be a success, given the Prince's powerful personal position in his country. We hope therefore that Mr Amery will accept the invitation to attend the reception.

4.

A personality note on the Prince is attached.

I J R Dando Middle East Department

3 July 1973

ENC

## FCO 8/2125 | Page 51

MR. HUNT MR HOIT

NB3208

RECEPTION IN HONOUR OF PRINCE ABDULLAH: 9 JULY

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A personality note on the Prince is attached, together with a copy of the general political background briefing prepared for the visit.

IJR Dando Middle East Department

3 July 1973

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## FCO 8/2125 | Page 52

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Lamb, Inspectorate

LORD CARRINGTON'S DINNER FOR PRINCE ABDULLAH: 5 JULY

1. I understand you have asked David Tatham for some background information on this visit. I hope the following will be helpful.

2. Prince Abdullah is visiting the United Kingdom from 4-10 July at the invitation of Lord Carrington as an official guest of Her Majesty's Government. The Ministry of Defence have prepared a programme which includes talks with Lord Carrington and Mr Gilmour, the Minister of State for Defence. Lord Baniel will be calling on the Prince on 4 July.

3. The Prince's visit is a mark of the improved relations we now enjoy with Saudi Arabia and we are anxious that it should be a success, given the Prince's powerful personal position.

4. The Dinner on 5 July will be attended by the following rabs in the Prince's party:

HD Shaikh Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Muhsin al-Tuwaijiri,

Under Secretary of the National Guard for Financial and Administrative Affairs

General Ibrahim al-Rashid, Military Commander of

the National Guard

Shaikh Khalid bin Muhammad bin Shalub, Director of

the Commander's Office for Financial and Military Affairs

Shaikh Hamad bin Salih al-Hamudi, Director of the

Commander's Office

Captain Sultan bin Khalil, Commander of the

National Guard Special Security Unit

First Lieutenant Faisal bin Abdul Muhsin al-Furm,

Deputy Commander, National Guard Police Unit

Dr Khalil Ahmad Tibu, Personal Physician.

5. A biographical note on Prince Abdullah is attached, together with a copy of the political background brief prepared for the visit.

6. The coordinator of the Prince's programme, including the arrangements for Lord Carrington's Dinner on 5 July, is Captain Briggs of the Ministry of Defence Protocol Department (telephone: MOD Main Building Ext 6608).

3 July 1973

Middle East Department CONFIDENTIAL

**FCO 8/2125 | Page 53**

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Coles

VISIT OF HRH PRINCE ABDULLAH BIN ABDUL AZIZ: 4 - 10 JULY

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DE Tatham 2 July 1973

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conditions; and

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## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 55**

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## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 56**

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which is a running sore in the two countries bilateral

relations, and reflects a personal antipathy between King Faisal and Shaikh Zaid. But we continue to urge on both sides the need for reconciliation. Saudi Arabia enjoys good

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/Arms for the

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 57**

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## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 58**

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## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 60**

ER

D/PROT/556/110

APS/SOI'S PS/MOIS PS/USOIS(Army) Sec/CNS PS/HDS PS/AUSD Staff) Commandant,  
RAC Centre Commandant, School of Infantry RMA Sandhurst (Col. Rees-Webbe) Bri gade-  
Major Household Division CO, Household Cavalry Regiment Queen's Flight (Mr. Oakes)  
FCO MED (Mr. Dando) Hd. DS11

VISIT OF PRINCE ABDULLA

Reference: D/PROT/556/110 of 29 th June, 1973. 1. Please aua to the appenāix of the former:

1. "No English".

"No English". 3. "ITO English".

"No English" "No English".

2.

"Some English".

"Little English". "Probably speaks English".

E.W. BRIGGS <captain, RN Protocol Officer Room 8336, MOD, Main Building, Whiteha  
11, SW1 Tel: 01-930-7022 Extension: 6608

2 July 1973

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LCO(Defence Department)

VISIT OF PRINCE ABDULLAH BIN ABDUL AZIZ, COMMANDER OF THE SAUDI  
NATIONAL GUARD: JULY 1973

As requested in your minute MO 25/8 of 21 June, I attach briefs for this visit. These have  
been agreed within the Department and where appropriate with the FCO.

A. B. FAYLE

HR BRADEN Hd of DS13 MB 0203 6855 MB

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VISIT OF PRINCE ABDULLAH BIN ABDUL AZIZ COMMANDER OF SAUDI  
NATIONAL GUARD: JULY 1973

BRIEFS PROVIDED:

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Personality Note

BRIEF 2

Political background brief

BRIEF 3

-

Defence relations

BRIEF 4

Iranian ideas for Defence co-operation in the Gulf (Defensive)

Saudi Arabian Armed Forces

BRIEF 5 BRIEF 6 BRIEF 7 BRIEF 8

Defence sales Assistance in the training of specialist explosive detection teams

British Military Mission: Brigadier Donaldson's successor

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Brief No. 1

PRINCE ABDULLAH BIN ABDUL AZIZ

Born 1922

One of the many sons of King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud the founder of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom: a half brother of King Feisal and Prince Sultan (the Minister of Defence).

Commander of the National Guard since February 1963.

He is the member of the Royal Family closest to the tribes. Abrupt, impulsive and a right-wing hard-liner but popular. He is regarded with considerable respect by the members of the British Military Mission attached to his headquarters.

A supporter of the Crown Prince Khalid. Probably personally ambitious and is likely to have a key-role in determining the succession to King Feisal but he seems more likely to work for a collective leadership than to set himself up as a contender for supreme power.

Enjoys hunting tring and horse-racing and is Chairman of the Riyadhah Horse-Racing Club.

Suffers from an impediment of speech. Does not speak English.

Middle East Department Foreign & Commonwealth Office LONDON S91 July 1973

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Brief No. 2

## VISIT OF PRINCE ABDULLAH BIN ABDUL AZIZ : JULY 1973

### Political Background Brief

General 1. The outlook for Saudi Arabia is set fair. Increasing revenues from oil have bolstered Saudi self-confidence at home and enhanced her political and economic position in the Arab world.

Anglo/Saudi Relations 2. Britain and Saudi Arabia share many of the same interests in the Middle East though there are underlying points of

friction. King Faisal still harbours resentment at our role

in Palestine during the Mandate, our defence of Abu Dhabi

during the Buraimi crisis in the 1950s, our handing over Aden to the National Front in 1967 and what he regards as British

connivance at Iranian occupation of the Tumbas and Abu Musa

Islands in the Persian Gulf in December 1971.

3.

There has however been a marked improvement in Anglo/

Saudi relations in the past year, helped by the improved relations we both enjoy with Egypt, by our common interest

in helping Oman and the Yemen Arab Republic resist subversion

from Aden, and by

(i)

the successful negotiation of the government-to

government agreement on the Saudi Arabian Air Defence Scheme;

(ii)

the Ministerial decision to sell Jaguar air

craft to Saudi Arabia subject to certain

conditions; and

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(iii) Lord Carrington's visit to the Kingdom in

April 1973. This visit, the invitations to Princes Abdullah and Sultan to visit Britain and the frequent "semi-private" visits of Prince Fahd and other prominent Saudis to London have helped to consolidate the welcome upturn

in Anglo/Saudi relations. 4. This year Saudi Arabia is our most important trading partner in the Arab world. British exports in 1972 amounted to £45.2m. There is however a strong trading balance in Saudi Arabia's favour because of our large imports of oil,

and we are examining ways of encouraging further British interest in this rapidly expanding market.

Saudi Foreign Relations

5.

Saudi Arabia's vastly increased wealth and more central position in the Arab world following Nasser's death have improved her standing in the Middle East. We have been urging the Saudi Government to assume the responsibilities it is now more able to bear, particularly in the Arabian

Peninsula, where our basic objectives coincide. Saudi Arabia

has begun to provide military and civil assistance to Oman, including helicopters for the Sultan of Oman's Air Force but we have been pressing the Saudi Government to increase its financial aid, both to Oman and the YAR.

6.

Saudi relations with the Gulf States are mixed. She

has still not recognised the United Arab Emirates. Since our withdrawal from the Gulf at the end of 1971 we have

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avoided involvement in the Saudi/ Abu Dhabi border dispute,

which is a running sore in the two countries bilateral relations, and reflects a personal antipathy between King Faisal and Shaikh Zaid. But we continue to urge on both sides the need for reconciliation. Saudi Arabia enjoys good

relations with Qatar. Relations with Iraq are now very poor

and the Iraqis are conducting a press and radio campaign

against Saudi Arabia. Relations with Iran are good but not

close.

Arab/Israel 7. King Faisal continues to be obsessed by what he describes

as the Zionist/Communist conspiracy but would probably agree

to whatever settlement the "confrontation" states could accept

The Internal Scene 8. The prestige and authority of the King remains strong and there is no obvious threat to the regime. His death is

unlikely to pose any immediate threat to the Royal Family:

the Crown Prince Khalid may be expected to succeed to the

throne and his half-brother Fahd to assume effective power. 9. Oil wealth is filtering slowly down the social scale. There has been very considerable material development and the main constraint on social progress is a shortage of

trained manpower. Saudi Arabia remains a closed society with

a repressive legal and administrative system.

The long term

danger to the regime lies in this contrast between economic dynamism and social immobility.

Arms for the

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Arms. For the Yemen Arab Republic 10. The YAR, like Oman, is facing a growing military and subversive threat from the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. She is very short of modern weapons. She is also short of cash, and recently asked Qatar for money to buy

arms.

11. Her Majesty's Government are ready to sell the YAR appropriate military equipment but the latter's exact

requirements are not yet known in any detail.

12. Our Ambassador in Jeddah has recently learned that

King Faisal has agreed in principle to help the YAR.

The

Saudi Government are, he said, considering two schemes of

military assistance: (i) a short-term scheme for the immediate supply of

small arms and light equipment from existing

Saudi sources; and (ii) a long-term scheme for the complete rebuilding

of the YAR Armed Forces which would involve a

sum of US \$1 billion if American equipment were

bought or about half that sum if the equipment

were bought from other Western sources. For

these financial reasons, equipment for ground forces might well come from non-American sources but the aircraft chosen would probably be F5s

(which Saudi Arabia already have).

13. None of this changes HMG's position which is that we

are willing and anxious to help the YAR in whatever way we

can.

(There was, for example, the recent visit to North

Yemen

Yemen by a British counter-subversion team at the request,

of the YAR Government.) We would certainly be interested in sales to their armed forces, if British equipment were preferred.

#### POINTS TO MAKE

1.

Ministers are particularly pleased with the recent

welcome improvement in Anglo/Saudi relations.

2.

Our interests in the Arabian Peninsula coincide.

We welcome Saudi Arabia's active interest in preserving the integrity and stability of neighbouring states such

as the YAR and Oman. We must keep in close touch and

exchange views on these matters.

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BRIEF NO 3

VISIT OF PRINCE ABDULLAH BIN ABDUL AZIZ

DEFENCE RELATIONS

BACKGROUND 1. We have no UK national defence interests in Saudi

Arabia but maintain and foster defence relations for political

reasons and in the context of sales to Saudi Arabia. No

UK Military Training Assistance Scheme (UKMTAS) allocation is

made to Saudi Arabia. Details of our current defence links with Saudi Arabia are as follows.

Army 2. A British Military Mission was established in Saudi Arabia in 1964 to advise the Saudi National Guard, a force of some 40,000 recruited from loyalist tribes. The National

Guard is commanded by HRH Prince Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz

who answers directly to King Faisal. The rules of the National Guard are to fight with the Army in defence of the Kingdom and to maintain law and order within the Kingdom.

3.

The British Mission is made up of six loan service officers headed by Brigadier A Donaldson (late RA).

They

are located at the National Guard school outside Riyadh and at

Jedda. The Mission carries out a variety of tasks, including:

a. Giving advice in response to requests from National Guard officers and officials. b. Anticipating the problems of the National Guard. c. Planning the modernisation and development of the National Guard.

Assisting and advising in the execution of military

plans, procedures and transactions.

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V

e.

Participating in boards and committees requiring

military expertise.

Arranging training courses for national Guard

students in the UK and dealing with their administrative

arrangements.

In November/December 1971, No 22 SAS trained a team of four members of the Saudi Arabian National Guard in all

aspects of bodyguard instruction. The students proved to

be poor material and in the time available they were unable

to qualify as instructors. A further four weeks training would have been necessary to bring them up to standard and it is thought that better results might have been achieved if the Saudis had fielded a larger team; eight would have been

a better number.

5. There is one Saudi student at Staff College, Camberley. There are no students currently at RMA Sandhurst but three have recently passed out on 9 March (including Prince Fahd, the son of Prince Sultan Fahd). One Saudi will be on the course starting 5 September 1973. Navy

6. There are no naval personnel on loan to Saudi Arabia, no students on naval courses in the UK and no bids on hand. For the first time since our withdrawal from the Gulf an RN ship visited a Saudi Arabian port this year - namely HMS ANTRIM (County Class guided missile destroyer) to Jedda from 18-21 February. Royal Air Force 7. Negotiations were successfully concluded earlier this year for BAC to take over from Airwork the maintenance of

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Saudi Lightning and Strikemaster aircraft under the umbrella.

of a Government to Government contract. Depending on the success BAC has in recruiting civilian staff, the RAF may be required to provide up to 70 personnel during the first year of the contract, thereafter the numbers falling to around 50. These will include the 15-strong MOD resident team in Saudi Arabia which will perform the important role of monitoring

the progress of the scheme for HMG. The first members of this

team leave for Saudi Arabia on 18 July. 8. A good deal of training is provided for the RSAF under a four year package scheme running from 1971 to the end of 1974

and linked to the sale of Lightning aircraft and Air Defence

Equipment. This was a little slow in getting under way, largely because the RSAF have been unable to put forward students to fill the training places, but we are offering as many places as possible in 1973 to reduce the backlog. After these initial difficulties the package is now operating smoothly and in some cases we have been able to offer training

additional to that agreed with the Saudis in order to meet

particular training requirements.

9.

Training under the package is being offered at subsidised

rates - approximately one-third of normal costs - the balance being waived as an offset against R&D levies on equipment sold to Saudi Arabia. Any shortfall under the package will be refunded. 10. There is one Saudi student at the RAF Staff College Bracknell - Prince Bandar bin Feisal bin Abdul Aziz - a son of the King.

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Line to Take

11. Drawing on the notes above as appropriate point out the fruitful military links between our two Governments. Look forward to continued co-operation.

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Brief No. 4

VISIT OF PRINCE ABDULLAH BIN ABDUL AZIZ : JULY 1973

Iranian Ideas for Defence Co-operation in the Gulf (Defensive)

1.

Prince Abdullah may raise with the Defence Secretary the subject of Iranian ideas either for defence co-operation in the Gulf, or for political co-operation aimed at excluding his power rivalries from the area. Mr Khalatbary, the Iranian Foreign Minister is due to have talks about this in Riyadh with King Faisal and Omar Saqqal from 1 - 4 July.

BACKGROUND

2. In the last two months the Shah, in news paper interviews and in discussion with HM Ambassador Tehran and with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, has laid emphasis on the need for more co-operation between Gulf countries. His

view is that the West's dependence on oil from Gulf countries and the strategic location of the Straits or Hormuz makes the

Gulf a key area, which is threatened by the Soviet Union and Iraq. Particularly since our withdrawal, the Shah considers

that the regional countries must take on the task of its

defence, with Iran having prime responsibility. Iran's large

armament programme is justified by this view.

3.

But the Shah wishes other Gulf countries to be

associated with Iran in this. He first canvassed the idea

of a mutual assistance pact between the Gulf countries, but

the Saudis did not respond enthusiastically when it was

discussed with them, and the Shah now takes the view that

such a pact is currently impracticable.

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4. The Shah's alternative suggestion is a declaration by the Gulf countries that great power rivalries should be excluded from the Gulf. The Iranians were concerned to discuss this proposal with us and indeed to associate HNG with it. We do not consider that such a declaration would have any significant effect on the Soviet Union or Iraq, and moreover are concerned that it could be used to embarrass us and the US because of our assistance to Oman, our personnel in the UAE and Kuwait and the US naval presence in Bahrain. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary was however able to persuade the Shah that any identification of HG with the

proposal would hinder rather than help its chances of

acceptance. 5. Following some moves for discussion of co-operation between some of the smaller Gulf countries the Shah now seems

ready to consider first an agreement between the Arab Gulf

states, then one between them and Iran. The Shah agreed with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary that consultation

with the other Gulf countries should be the next step, and the Iranians have already discussed the proposal with Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE, who are said to have agreed to it as long

as all the other countries. do. But Khalatoary's visit in early July will be the first Saudi-Iranian discussion of the Iranian ideas. We would expect the Saudis to be sceptical of Iran's motives, but not necessarily to oppose some sort of declaration.

/ LINE TO TAKE

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LINE TO TAKE

(If Prince Abdullah refers to the Shah's ideas themselves) 6. We know that the Shah is concerned about the possible Soviet or Iraqi threat to the oil assets of the Gulf States, and the key strategic location of the Straits of Hormuz. His own defence programme for Iran is based on the need for

countries in the area to be able to defend themselves against such threats. Saudi defence proposals are presumably based on similar thinking. We have noted that the Shah is concerned that countries in the area should co-operate where possible.

(If Prince Abdullah refers to possible co-operation between the countries)

7.

The Shah earlier publicly reierred to the possibility of active defence co-operation between countries of the Gulf. Such co-operation could enhance the stability oi the area, which we would welcome, as long as any arrangement was on a basis satisfactory to the countries concerned:. Saudi Arabia's

own position would be fundamental. Does Prince Abdullah consider that a defence co-operation arrangement, taking in both Iran and Saudi Arabia, might be feasible at some stage?



(Khalatbary Visit and ideas for co-operation aimed at excluding outside powers) 8. We understand that Mr Khalatvary, the Iranian Foreign Minister was visiting Saudi Arabia between 1 - 4 July to discuss general aspects of co-operation in the Gulf. Present Iranian thinking appears to be aimed at some sort of declaration asking the great powers to stay out of the Gulf. We would

3

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hope that any such measure would not hamper the ability of friendly countries like the UK to help our friends in the area. (If Prince Abdullah casts doubts on Iran's motives) 9. Our impression is that the Shah really is concerned

about the threat from factors like the Soviet Union and Iraq, and that this guides all his actions. We would not expect Iran to try to push through plans and ideas involving other countries without full consultation with them and without taking account of factors important to them..

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SECRET UK EYES B

BRIEF NO.5

VISIT OF PRINCE ABDULLAH BIN ABDUL AZIZ

SAUDI ARABIAN ARMED FORCES

General 1. The Saudi Arabian Armed Forces are small and of low efficiency despite the assistance of American and British

training and technical assistance. They have little or no offensive capability and only a very limited defensive capability against any major assault. They have the ability to control the internal situation but their loyalty is an

uncertain factor which is offset only by the undoubted loyalty of the large National Guard.

Army

2.

The army is organised

into four independent infantry

brigade groups, each having three infantry battalions and a number of support companies. Equipment is mainly American; nevertheless, and despite American training assistance, general military standards are low. Promotion is slow, senior officers are of a low calibre and the loyalty of the army as a whole is in doubt at least in the eyes of the Royal Family, which

keeps the army geographically well dispersed.

National Guard 3. As a further precaution against any possible coup a

large National Guard is maintained which, being recruited

mainly from the Bedu tribes is loyal to the Royal Family..

SECRET UK EYES B

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SECRET UK EYES B

The National Guard is commanded by HRH Prince Adbullah bin Abdul Aziz, who is answerable directly to the King. It is a force of at most 40,000 men recruited from the Loyalist tribes of the Nejd. A third of the force, known as fedayeen and organised into 12 infantry units of up to 1,000 men each

and armed with light and medium infantry weapons, is completely

mobile and is stationed near the main cities and tribal centre.

The remained, less well-equipped and trained, are known as

mujahadeen and are distributed in 26 groups at centre of

population throughout the country;

they provide a back-up

force for the fedayeen. 4. The roles of the National Guard are:

a.

To fight alongside the Army in the Defence of the

Kingdom. b. To provide a force at instant readiness to maintain

law and order within the boundaries of the Kingdom. 5. Units are deployed throughout the Kingdom and are almost certainly capable of containing any local dissident threat to law and order. But it is unlikely that they could deal with a coordinated military rebellion.

Air Force

6.

The air force has 41 combat aircraft (Lightnings),

34 training aircraft (BAC-167a and F-86s) which could be used

in an offensive role. 10 C130 transport aircraft and some search and rescue helicopters. Ten Hawk squadrons defend the main airfields. Twenty F5P trainers and 30 F-5E air defence fighters, 10 C-130s (including four tankers), 10 BAC-167 and more helicopters are on order. The F-5s are expected to be

SECRET UK EYES B

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delivered by the end of 1974; the Lightnings may then be phased out. There is also a prospect of 15 Rapier fire units

being purchased.

The installation of a British early warning

and control radar system is expected to be complete by early 1974, but manning difficulties are likely to inhibit full realisation of its defensive potential.

Navy

7. The navy has three German motor torpedo boats and three American small patrol boats. It is probable that none of the

latter are operational and that the former have no torpedoes.

However, there is a large training programme for officers and ratings in Pakistan and it therefore seems likely that a

considerable expansion is planned.

The Saudi Arabian coastguard

is responsible to the Minister of Interior. It has a large

number of fast patrol craft and eight SRN-6 hovercraft which

give a capability only of coastal surveillance.

SECRET UK EYES B

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BRIEF NO: 6

VISIT OF PRINCE ABDULLAH BIN ABDUL AZIZ

DEFENCE SALES BRIEF

1.

The major items of equipment in which the National Guard are showing interest are set out below.

SCORPION AND FOX 2. The National Guard have a requirement for light armoured vehicles and have thought mainly in terms of wheeled armour in the Saracen/Saladin/Fox range.

In October 1970 Prince Abdullah asked the MOD to make proposals for reorganisation

of part of the National Guard into self-contained battle groups. MOD appointed Major General Goddard to lead the Study Team and General Goddard presented his proposals in March 1971. These included the formation of mechanised companies to be carried in Saracen APCs and Saladin armoured cars. The proposals also included Fox and Stalwart. We were advised by Prince Abdullah in January 1972 that, for political reasons, he did not wish to take up the proposals. It is believed

that the plan would have gone too far towards changing the balance of power

between the National Guard and the Army. The Prince has since accepted a United States plan for the piecemeal development of the National Guard over the next ten years. It remains to be seen what sales we can make from the re-equipment recommended by the Americans. The main competition comes from the USA with the

Gage Cadillac Commando and from France with a Panhard based vehicle.

3.

Currently the National Guard has no armoured vehicles other than converted vehicles such as Land Rover but British industry can no longer provide wheeled vehicles of the Saracen/Saladin type and we are now faced with a need to convince

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Prince Abdullah that a tracked vehicle such as Scorpion can adequately meet his needs and that a combined force of Fox and Scorpion will be entirely suited to the purposes of the National Guard. To this end a presentation of Fox and Scorpion was made to the National Guard and to the Army in Jedda and Riyadh in May this year. Although Prince Abdullah was not present, that presentation has stimulated the interest of the Saudis and we are now following this up with a demonstration at Larkhill on 6 July which will include a firepower demonstration. 4. The proposal to demonstrate Fox and Scorpion ashore in Saudi Arabia during the visit of RFA Tarbatness in September has not materialised.

The Saudi

Authorities believed that the Iraqis would give such a demonstration adverse publicity and have therefore refused to give it their permission. Tarbatness will not therefore be visiting Saudi Arabia. 5. Because the development of the National Guard is now to be on a piecemeal

basis we do not know what quantities of vehicles are being considered and no value can therefore be put on any potential order at this stage.

RAPIER 6. Secretary of State will remember that, during his visit to Saudi Arabia earlier this year, Prince Abdullah briefly mentioned an interest in Rapier for

the National Guard. The potential order is expected to be for about half a

battery at a cost in excess of £6M. It is understood that the National Guard are interested in both the visually and radar (Blindfire DN 181) guided versions of the weapon. Rapier will therefore also be demonstrated at Larkhill on 6 July. 7. Secretary of State will wish to note that Prince Sultan is also interested

in obtaining Rapier for the defence of military bases.

8. If orders for these equipments should emerge it is probable that, as with other recent major orders, the Saudi Authorities will press for a Government-to Government deal.

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### **VIGILANT MISSILES**

9. Following a complaint by the National Guard that some of the missiles purchased in 1963 were unsafe a BAC team examined the missiles and found that only about 20% of the 195 remaining were unfit for operational use. None was unsafe. The team estimated that it would cost about £20,000 to bring them up to operational standard and, as a gesture of goodwill, BAC agreed to bear half that cost with the National Guard.

### **SPEAKING NOTES**

10. S of \$ may like to make the following points:

#### **VISIT TO LARKHILL: DEMONSTRATION OF RAPIER SCORPION AND FOX**

I am glad to hear that Prince Abdullah will be seeing some demonstrations of British equipment at Larkhill.

#### **RAPIER**

I remember that Prince Abdullah told me of his interest in Rapier when

I was in Saudi and hope that Prince Abdullah will see all he wishes.

Rapier is in current production for the British Army and Air Force

who find its high degree of mobility and ease of operation great assets. **SCORPION**

The British Army finds Scorpion to be faster than most comparable wheeled vehicles and has greater cross-country mobility. **DEFENSIVE NOTE: VIGILANT MISSILES**

11.

Should Prince Abdullah refer to this past problem S of S should say that he is glad that it has now been satisfactorily settled.

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Brief No: 7

VISIT OF PRINCE ABDULLAH BIN ABDUL AZIZ

### **ASSISTANCE IN THE TRAINING OF SPECIALIST EXPLOSIVE DETECTION TEAMS**

BACKGROUND NOTE 1. The National Guard in Saudi Arabia has been given the responsibility for protecting the Trans Arabian Pipeline (TAPLINE). They have deployed a battalion along the pipeline and wish to form a team to undertake the detection and immunisation of explosive devices. The Commander of the National Guard, Prince Abdullah bin Aziz has asked for

British, military or civilian experts to assist in their training. 2. A reconnaissance was arranged in Saudi Arabia in April and a report was produced (a copy of which was given to Prince Abdullah on 22nd April) which recommended:

a. That a certain amount of specialist equipment would be required by the National Guard - this could be purchased through the British MOD;

b. a British Warrant Officer should be sent to Saudi Arabia

for approximately one month's attachment to train the National

Guard detection teams; c. that at least 10 men, should be trained in Britain in

the recognition and immunisation of all explosive devices and

conventional mines.

These recommendations appear not to have been wholly acceptable to

Prince Abdullah who has suggested that a British officer or NCO should

be loaned to the National Guard for up to a year, or that a contract

officer or NCO might be obtained. Even if we were convinced of the Saudi

need we could offer no help at present because no suitably qualified

personnel are available. The situation may ease later in the year

but we can make no promises. The best we could do is to offer to consider any request against the resources available (or likely to become available) when the request is made.

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The British Military Attache in Jedda has been informed

that no suitable personnel are available at present to take up

a loan service post;

that if the Saudis wish to offer a job

to a contract officer, the Saudi Government must advertise the

vacancy; and that the best answer would appear to be the

solution offered by the recce report, The initiative now rests with Prince Abdullah. So far no fir requests have been

received for courses in the UK or the loan of a Warrant Officer;

and no orders have been placed for the necessary equipment. Line to Take (Defensive). 4. If asked you should say that this is a very specialised

sphere and the experts are in great demand. As a first step

we suggest that the necessary equipment should be purchased by Saudi Arabia. We could then provide the services of one Warrant Officer for about a month to train the National Guard

detection teams. We can also allocate vacancies on UK courses; the Military Attache has the necessary details and he would be

glad to advise the Saudi Authorities further. If pressed to

loan an officer or NCO to the National Guard for an extended

period: at present we would find it very difficult to lend you an officer or NCO for any longer than a month. Our commitments in Northern Ireland are such that we need all our experts for this and other purposes. We can therefore hold out little hope of helping you but if you wish to make a formal request we will



see what can be done.

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Brief No: 8 7 1973

VISIT OF PRINCE ABDULLAH BIN ABDUL AZIZ FUTURE OF BRIGADIER  
DONALDSON

### Background

Brigadier Adrian Donaldson has been Head of the British Military

Mission to the National Guard for over 6 years. His present term of  
service is due to come to an end in October 1974.

A suitable

replacement has been provisionally selected and approved and the incidence of other changes  
in the BMM's staff make this a good time for

a changeover.

2. The strong probability however is that, having established a relationship of friendship and  
confidence with Brigadier Donaldson, Prince Abdullah will wish him to stay beyond October  
1974. We know

that the Brigadier (who has been told that he cannot expect a Brigadiers appointment on his  
return to this country) would like to stay longer in Saudi Arabia and if he were offered the job  
on contract terms he would certainly resign and take it. Line to Take 3. The Secretary of State  
should raise the question of Brigadier Donaldson's future with Prince Abdullah. He could say  
that we have

an excellent replacement in mind with recent command experience in Dhofar. If the Prince  
indicates (as we expect he may do) that keeping Brigadier Donaldson is his price for keeping  
the Mission as a whole,

the Secretary of State should accept this and inform the Prince we

are prepared to agree to Brigadier Donaldson's staying on as a servins

British officer. We might wish to suggest that he return for an

attachment of a month or two to brush up on current British Army

practice and equipment.

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### **ANNEX A**

#### **BRITISH MILITARY MISSION TO THE NATIONAL GUARD, SAUDI ARABIA**

(Note by British Embassy, Jedda)

Since 1961 there has been a British Military Mission attached

to the National Guard, in Saudi Arabia.

The Mission consists

of a Brigadier (at present Brigadier Sir Ian Donaldson) and five other

officers; its HQ is in Riyadh, but one officer is detached to Jedda. Over the years it has created for itself a position of influence and trust, and Prince Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz, Commander of the National Guard and a brother of King Faisal, has repeatedly stated that he continues to be highly satisfied with its

performance.

2. Though the Mission's position may in this sense be strong, it has not achieved very much in the way of sales of British

equipment, partly no doubt because members of the Mission, in

fostering their reputation for objectivity, tend to lean over

board not to appear to be biased towards the United Kingdom. Partly in an effort to remedy this we submitted to Prince Abdullah

some two years ago a British plan for the modernisation and re

equipping of the National Guard. In the event the plan was

rejected, mainly, we think, because King Faisal and Prince Sultan

bin Abdul Aziz, the Minister of Defence, considered that it was on too large a scale and would thus go too far towards changing the balance of power between the National Guard and the Army. However that may be, we for our part took umbrage at the manner

of the plan's rejection:

Back at Brigadier Donaldson with the comment that it had been

rejected "for political reasons". By the time the Ambassador

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 91**

arrived in June 1972 communications between Prince Abouloff and the Embassy were almost nonexistent, and the Prince has since accepted a United States plan for the piecemeal development of the National Guard over the next ten years.

3. One element in the Embassy's relationship with the National Guard was that while we and the Ministry of Defence considered

that it was time for Brigadier Donaldson to be replaced he himself wanted to stay on for financial reasons and Prince Abdullah also wanted him to stay on because of their personal relationship.

The Ambassador decided that the only way in which we could

effectively begin to repair the relations between the Embassy and Prince Abdullah was to agree that Brigadier Donaldson should

remain for another two years, and this was duly arranged with the Ministry of Defence.

4.

With this as a starting point the Ambassador has been at

some pains to establish a relationship with Prince Abdullah, and

has had some success. The Prince commented recently that if things had been in the past as they are now everything would have been different; whether this means that a revised British plan

rather than an American plan to develop the National Guard would have been accepted it is not possible to say.

It remains to be

seen how much business we can get out of re-equipment requirements

by the Americans; it also remains to be seen how happily the British Military Mission will fit into the changed scheme of

things.

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5.

We have recently learned that the National Guard have set up a separate office to deal with the US project team and have told the team that they are not to work through the British Military Mission.

The Americans are adamant that there will be no friction between the team and the Military Mission but this development increases the chances that the overall value of the Mission to us will diminish.

6.

A complicating factor is a recurrence of the situation in which we and the Ministry of Defence consider that Brigadier Donaldson's secondment should not be extended while he himself still wishes to continue to serve here (and is apparently prepared to do so on a contract basis if he could not do so with the approval of the Ministry of Defence).

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CYPHER CAT A AM JEDDA 300855Z JUNE CONFIDENTIAL

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TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 319 OF 39/6/73.

YOUR TEL NO 245: PRINCE SULTAN'S VISIT

1. EITHER TURKI GOT IT WRONG OR. I DID OR SULTAN CHANGED HIS MIND, AT ALL EVENTS HE MADE NO MENTION OF THIS MATTER WHEN I SAW HIM ON 28 JUNE,

2. I DO NOT WISH TO START ANY MORE HARES BUT IT OCCURS TO ME THAT, GIVEN THE TONE OF OUR EXCHANGES ON THAT DATE (MY TEL DIG EDQ 299915Z JUN PARA 1 REFERS), SULTAN MIGHT WELL NOT CHOOSE TO TAKE UP LORD CARRINGTON'S INVITATION UNTIL WE HAVE GOT SADAP ON THE RAILS,

3. WE SHALL, OF COURSE, BEAR LORD CARRINGTON'S PREFERRED DATES IN MIND

ROTHNIE

)

FILES

MED DEFENCE D PS/LORD BALNIEL MR. PARSONS MR ROSE

COPIES TO:

PS TO LORD CARRINGTON PROTOCOL DEPT HD DS 11 HD DS 6 HD DS 8 MR MACDONALD SALES 1A.

STUART HOUSE

MOD

CONFIDENTIAL

**FCO 8/2125 | Page 94**

GRS 80A PRIORITY CYPHER / CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

(MED)

FM FCO 291450Z CONFIDENTIAL TO PRIORITY JEDDA TELNO 245 OF 29 JUNE 1973.

YOUR TELEGRAM TO MODUK 261328Z

PRINCE SULTAN'S VISIT.

1. OWING TO OTHER MINISTERIAL VISITS, PLANNED LEAVE ABROAD, AND COMMITMENTS AS PARTY CHAIRMAN, LORD CARRINGTON WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO HOST VISIT BY PRINCE SULTAN UNTIL MID SEPTEMBER

2. SO THAT HE MAY GIVE THE PRINCE'S VISIT DUE PERSONAL ATTENTION HE HOPES SUGGESTION OF MID-SEPTEMBER COULD BE PUT TO THE PRINCE ON THIS BASIS, A PERIOD CONVENIENT FOR LORD CARRINGTON WOULD BE THE WEEK 17-21 SEPTEMBER. DOUGLAS-HOME FILES

COPIES TO: MED

PS/LORD CARRINGTON DEFENCE D

PROTOCOL DEPT MR PARSONS

HDS MR ROSE

HD/DS 11

MOD PS, LORD BALNIEL

HD/DS 6 HD/DS 8 MR MACDONALD SALES 1A

STUART HSE CONFIDENTIAL

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 95**

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DS11

Copies to: DS5 DS6 DD OP DP(C) ICO (ICD)

- 3 JUL 1975 REGISTR0.35

RECEIVED IN

VISIT OF PRINCE ABDULLAH

Ref: Your minute DS11/2/8 dated 28th June

1. I attach a revised input on the RAF aspects of Defence Relations with Saudi Arabia, This has intentionally been kept quite short because Prince Abdullah, Commander of the National Guard, will not be interested in discussing with S of the details of the Saudi Air Defence Scheme or the four year programme of training that the RAF is currently undertaking for the Saudis.

29 Jun 73

H H CHAMBERS DS8

CONFIDENTIAL

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 96**

IA

Royal Air Force

1. The Secretary of State will be aware that negotiations were guccessfully concluded earlier this year for BAC to take over from lirworks the maintenance of Saudi Lightning and Strikemaster aircraft under the wbrella of a Covernment to Governnent contract. Dependins on the success 310 933 in recruiting civilian stali, the R? may be requirci to provide up to 70 personnel during the first year of the contract, thereafter the numbers falling to around 50. mhese vill include the 15-strong TOD rosidnt tean in Saudi Arabia which will perform the important role ol monitoring the progress of the scheme for HIG. The first members of this team leave for Saudi Arabia on 18th July.

4. There is one Sardi student at the RI? Star 70110 Orcinell Prince Bandar bin Feisal bin Abdul Aziz - a son of the Kins.

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SECRET U.K. EYES "B"

DS13

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DS5

DS6

without

attachments - FCO(MED) FCO(Defence Department)

VISIT OF PRINCE ABDULLAH BIN ABDUL AZIZ

1. As requested I attach briefs for Prince Abdullah's visit which we have produced in consultation with copy addressees. They consist of:

a. Political briefs.

Defence relations.

c. Assistance in the training of explosives experts. d. British Military Mission. e. Brigadier Donaldson's successor f. Personality note.

g. Saudi Arabian Armed Forces.

29 Jun 73

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## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 98**

Brief No.

VISIT OF PRINCE ABDULLAH BIN ABDUL AZIZ : JULY 1973

Political Background Brief

General

The outlook for Saudi Arabia is set fair.

Increasing

revenues from oil have bolstered Saudi self-confidence at home and enhanced her political and economic position in the Arab world.

Anglo/Saudi Relations

Britain and Saudi Arabia share many of the same interests

in the Middle East though there are underlying points of friction: King Faisal still harbours resentment at our role in Palestine during the Mandate, our defence of Abu Dhabi

during the Buraimi crisis in the 1950s, our handing over Aden

to the National Front in 1967 and what he regards as British connivance at Iranian occupation of the Tunbs and Abu Musa Islands in the Persian Gulf in December 1971.

3.

There has however been a marked improvement in Anglo/



Saudi relations in the past year, helped by the improved relations we both enjoy with Egypt, by our common interest in helping Oman and the Yemen Arab Republic resist subversion from Aden, and by

(i)

the successful negotiation of the government-to-government agreement on the Saudi Arabian Air Defence Scheme; the Ministerial decision to sell Jaguar air

(ii)

craft to Saudi Arabia subject to certain conditions; and

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(iii) Lord Carrington's visit to the Kingdom in April 1973.

This visit, the invitations to Princes Abdullah and Sultan to visit Britain and the frequent semi--private visits of Prince Fahd and other prominent Saudis to London have helped to consolidate the welcome upturn in Anglo/Saudi relations.

This year Saudi Arabia is our most important trading partner in the Arab world. British exports in 1972 amounted to £45.2m. There is however a strong trading balance in

Saudi Arabia's favour because of our large imports of oil, and we are examining ways of encouraging further British interest in this rapidly expanding market.

#### Saudi Foreign Relations

Saudi Arabia's vastly increased wealth and more central position in the Arab world following Nasser's death have improved her standing in the Middle East. We have been urging the Saudi Government to assume the responsibilities it is now more able to bear, particularly in the Arabian Peninsula where our basic objectives coincide. Saudi Arabia has begun to provide military and civil assistance to Oman, including helicopters for the Sultan of Oman's Air Force but we have been pressing the Saudi Government to increase its financial aid, both to Oman and the YAR.

6.

Saudi relations with the Gulf States are mixed. She has still not recognised the United Arab Emirates. Since our withdrawal from the Gulf at the end of 1971 we have

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avoided involvement in the Saudi/Abu Dhabi border dispute, which is a running sore in the two countries bilateral relations, and reflects a personal antipathy between King Faisal and Shaikh Zaid. But we continue to urge on both

sides the need for reconciliation

Saudi Arabia enjoys good

relations with Qatar

Relations with Iraq are now very poor

and the Iraqis are conducting a press and radio campaign against Saudi Arabia. Relations with Iran are good but not close. Arab/Israel

King Faisal continues to be obsessed by what he describes as the Zionist/Communist conspiracy but would probably agree to whatever settlement the "confrontation" states could accept.

#### The Internal Scene

8. The prestige and authority of the King remains strong and there is no obvious threat to the regime. His death is

unlikely to pose any immediate threat to the Royal Family:

the Crown Prince Khalid may be expected to succeed to the throne and his half-brother Fahd to assume effective power.

9.

Oil wealth is filtering slowly down the social scale.

There has been very considerable material development and the main constraint on social progress is a shortage of trained manpower, Saudi Arabia remains a closed society with a repressive legal and administrative system.

The long term

danger to the regime lies in this contrast between economic dynamism and social immobility.

Arms for the

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Arms for the Yemen Arab Republic 10. The YAR, like Oman, is facing a growing military and

subversive threat from the People's Democratic Republic of

Yemen. She is very short of modern weapons. She is also

short of cash, and recently asked Qatar for money to buy

11. Her Majesty's Government are ready to sell the YAR

appropriate military equipment but the latter's exact

requirements are not yet known in any detail.

12. Our Ambassador in Jedda has recently learned that

King Faisal has agreed in principle to help the YAR. The

Saudi Government are, he said, considering two schemes of

military assistance:

(i) a short-term scheme for the immediate supply of

Small arms and light equipment from existing

Saudi sources; and

(ii) a long-term scheme for the complete rebuilding

of the YAR Armed Forces which would involve a

sum of US 32 billion if American equipment were

bought or about half that sum if the equipment

were bought from other Western sources. For these financial reasons, equipment for ground

forces might well come from non-American sources

but the aircraft chosen would probably be F5s

(which Saudi Arabia already have). 13. None of this changes HMG's position which is that we are willing and anxious to help the YAR in whatever way we can. (There was, for example, the recent visit to North

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Yemen by a British counter-subversion team at the request of the YAR Government.) We would certainly be interested

in sales to their armed forces, if British equipment were preferred.

### **POINTS TO MAKE**

1.

Ministers are particularly pleased with the recent

welcome improvement in Anglo/ Saudi relations.

2. Our interests in the Arabian Peninsula coincide. We welcome Saudi Arabia's active interest in preserving

the integrity and stability of neighbouring states such

as the YAR and Oman. We must keep in close touch and

exchange views on these matters.

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Brief No.

VISIT OF PRINCE ABDULLAH BIN ABDUL AZIZ : JULY 1973

Iranian Ideas for Defence Co-operation in the Gulf (Defensive)

Prince Abdullah may raise with the Defence Secretary the

subject of Iranian ideas either for defence co-operation in the Gulf, or for political co-operation aimed at excluding

big power rivalries from the area. Mr Khalatbary, the Iranian

Foreign Minister is due to have talks about this in Riyadh with

King Faisal and Omar Saqqaf from 1 - 4 July.

## BACKGROUND

2.

In the last two months the Shah, in news paper interviews and in discussion with HM Ambassador Tehran and with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, has laid emphasis on the need for more co-operation between Gulf countries. His view is that the West's dependence on oil from Gulf countries and the strategic location of the Straits of Hormuz makes the Gulf a key area, which is threatened by the Soviet Union and Iraq. Particularly since our withdrawal, the Shah considers that the regional countries must take on the task of its defence, with Iran having prime responsibility. Iran's large armament programme is justified by this view.

3.

But the Shah wishes other Gulf countries to be associated with Iran in this. He first canvassed the idea of a mutual assistance pact between the Gulf countries, but the Saudis did not respond enthusiastically when it was discussed with them, and the Shah now takes the view that such a pact is currently impracticable.

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The Shah's alternative suggestion is a declaration by the Gulf countries that great power rivalries should be

excluded from the Gulf.

The Iranians were concerned to

discuss this proposal with us and indeed to associate HMG

with it. We do not consider that such a declaration would

have any significant effect on the Soviet Union or Iraq, and

moreover are concerned that it could be used to embarrass

us and the US because of our assistance to Oman, our personnel in the UAE and Kuwait and the US naval presence in Bahrain.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary was however able to

persuade the Shah that any identification of HHG with the proposal would hinder rather than help its chances of

acceptance.

5.

Following some moves for discussion of co-operation

between some of the smaller Gulf countries the Shah now seems

ready to consider first an agreement between the Arab Gulf states, then one between them and Iran. The Shah agreed

with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary that consultation

with the other Gulf countries should be the next step, and

the Iranians have already discussed the proposal with Bahrain,

Qatar and the UAE, who are said to have agreed to it as long

as all the other countries do. But Khalatbary's visit in early July will be the first Saudi-Iranian discussion of the

Iranian ideas. We would expect the Saudis to be sceptical

of Iran's motives, but not necessarily to oppose some sort of declaration.

/ LINE TO TAKE

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LINE TO TAKE

(If Prince Abdullah refers to the Shah's ideas themselves)

We know that the Shah is concerned about the possible

Soviet or Iraqi threat to the oil assets of the Gulf States,

and the key strategic location of the Straits of Hormuz.

His own defence programme for Iran is based on the need for countries in the area to be able to defend themselves against such threats, Saudi defence proposals are presumably based on similar thinking. We have noted that the Shah is concerned that countries in the area should co-operate where possible.

(If Prince Abdullah refers to possible co-operation between

the countries) 7. The Shah earlier publicly referred to the possibility of active defence co-operation between countries of the Gulf. Such co-operation could enhance the stability of the area,

which we would welcome, as long as any arrangement was on a

basis satisfactory to the countries concerned: Saudi Arabia's own position would be fundamental. Does Prince Abdullah consider that a defence co-operation arrangement, taking in

both Iran and Saudi Arabia, might be feasible at some stage?

(Khalatbary Visit and ideas for co-operation aimed at

excluding outside powers). 8. We understand that Mr Khalatbary, the Iranian Foreign

Minister was visiting Saudi Arabia between 1 - 4 July to

discuss general aspects of co-operation in the Gulf. Present

Iranian thinking appears to be aimed at some sort of declaration

asking the great powers to stay out of the Gulf. We would

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hope that any such measure would not hamper the ability of friendly countries like the UK to help our friends in

the area.

(If Prince Abdullah casts doubts on Iran's motives) 9. Our impression is that the Shah really is concerned about the threat from factors like the Soviet Union and Iraq, and that this guides all his actions. We would not expect Iran to try to push through plans and ideas involving other countries without full consultation with them and

without taking account of factors important to them.

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BRIEFNO

VISIT OF PRINCE ABDULLAH BIN ABDUL AZIZ

DEFENCE RELATIONS

BACKGROUND

We have no UK national defence interests in Saudi

Arabia but maintain and foster defence relations for political

reasons and in the context of sales to Saudi Arabia. No UK Military Training Assistance Scheme (UKMTAS) allocation is made to Saudi Arabia. Details of our current defence links

with Saudi Arabia are as follows.

Army 2. A British Military Mission was established in Saudi Arabia in 1964 to advise the Saudi National Guard, a force of some 40,000 recruited from loyalist tribes. The National Guard is commanded by HRH Prince Addullah bin Abdul Aziz

who answers directly to King Faisal. The rules of the National Guard are to fight with the Army in defence of the

Kingdom and to maintain law and order within the Kingdom.

3.

The British Mission is made up of six loan service

officers headed by Brigadier A Donaldson (late RA). They are located at the National Guard school outside Riyadh and at Jedda. The Mission carries out a variety of tasks, including:

a. Giving advice in response to requests from National Guard officers and officials. b. Anticipating the problems of the National Guard.

c.

Planning the modernisation and development of the National Guard.

d.

Assisting and advising in the execution of military plans, procedures and transactions.

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e.

Participating in boards and committees requiring military expertise.

Arranging training courses for national Guard students in the UK and dealing with their administrative arrangements.

In November/December 1971, No 22 SAS trained a team of four members of the Saudi Arabian National Guard in all aspects of bodyguard instruction.

The students proved to

be poor material and in the time available they were unable to qualify as instructors. A further four weeks training would have been necessary to bring them up to standard and it

is thought that better results might have been achieved if the Saudis had fielded a larger team; eight would have been a better number.

5.

There is one Saudi student at Staff College, Camberley.

There are no students currently at RMA Sandhurst but three have recently passed out on 9 March (including Prince Fand, the son of Prince Sultan Faha). One Saudi will be on the course starting 5 September 1973.

Navy

6. There are no naval personnel on loan to Saudi Arabia, no students on naval courses in the UK and no bids on hand. For the first time since our withdrawal from the Gulf an

RN ship visited a Saudi Arabian port this year - namely

HMS ANTRIM (County Class guided missile destroyer) to Jedda

from 18-21 February.

Royal Air Force

Negotiations were successfully concluded earlier this

year for BAC to take over from Airwork the maintenance of

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Saudi Lightning and Strikemaster aircraft under the umbrella

of a Government to Government contract. Depending on the

success BAC has in recruiting civilian staff, the RAF may

be required to provide up to 70 personnel during the first year of the contract, thereafter the numbers falling to around

50.

These will include the 15-strong MOD resident team in

Saudi Arabia which will perform the important role of monitoring

the progress of the scheme for HMG. The first members of this team leave for Saudi Arabia on 18 July.

8.

A good deal of training is provided for the RSAF under a four year package scheme running from 1971 to the end of 1974 and linked to the sale of Lightning aircraft and Air Defence Equipment. This was a little slow in getting under way, largely because the RSAF have been unable to put forward students to fill the training places, but we are offering as many places as possible in 1973 to reduce the backlog. After these initial difficulties the package is now operating smoothly and in some cases we have been able to offer training additional to that agreed with the Saudis in order to meet particular training requirements. 9. Training under the package is being offered at subsidised rates - approximately one-third of normal costs - the balance being waived as an offset against R&D levies on equipment sold to Saudi Arabia. Any shortfall under the package will be refunded.

10. There is one Saudi student at the RAF Staff College Bracknell - Prince Bandar bin Feisal bin Abdul Aziz - a son of the King.

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Brief No:

VISIT OF PRINCE ABDULLAH BIN ABDUL AZIZ ASSISTANCE IN THE TRAINING OF SPECIALIST EXPLOSIVE DETECTION TEAMS BACKGROUND NOTE

1. The National Guard in Saudi Arabia has been given the responsibility for protecting the Trans Arabian Pipeline (TAPLINE). They have deployed

a battalion along the pipeline and wish to form a team to undertake

the detection and immunisation of explosive devices. The Commander

of the National Guard, Prince Abdullah bin Aziz has asked for British, military or civilian experts to assist in their training.

A reconnaissance was arranged in Saudi Arabia in April and a

report was produced (a copy of which was given to Prince Abdullah on

22nd April) which recommended:

a. That a certain amount of specialist equipment would be required by the National Guard - this could be purchased through the British MOD;

b. a British Warrant Officer should be sent to Saudi Arabia

for approximately one month's attachment to train the National

Guard detection teams;

that at least 10 men, should be trained in Britain in

the recognition and immunisation of all explosive devices and

conventional mines.

These recommendations appear not to have been wholly acceptable to

Prince Abdullah who has suggested that a British officer or NCO should

be loaned to the National Guard for up to a year, or that a contract

officer or NCO might be obtained. Even if we were convinced of the Saudi

need we could offer no help at present because no suitably qualified

personnel are available. The situation may ease later in the year but we can make no promises. The best we could do is to offer: to consider any request against the resources available (or likely to become available) when the request is made.

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Line to Take 11. Drawing on the notes above as appropriate point out the fruitful military links between our two Governments. Look forward to continued co-operation.

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3.

The British Military Attache in Jedda has been informed

that no suitable personnel are available at present to take up a loan service post; that if the Saudis wish to offer a job

to a contract officer, the Saudi Government must advertise the

vacancy; and that the best answer would appear to be the solution offered by the recce report, The initiative now rests

with Prince Abdullah. So far no firm requests have been received for courses in the UK or the loan of a Warrant Officer; and no orders have been placed for the necessary equipment.

Line to Take (Defensive)

4. If asked you should say that this is a very specialised sphere and the experts are in great demand. As a first step

We suggest that the necessary equipment should be purchased by

Saudi Arabia. We could then provide the services of one

Warrant Officer for about a month to train the National Guard

detection teams. We can also allocate vacancies on UK courses; the Military Attache has the necessary details and he would be •glad to advise the Saudi Authorities further. If pressed to loan an officer or NCO to the National Guard for an extended

period: at present we would find it very difficult to lend you an officer or NCO for any longer than a month. Our commitments in Northern Ireland are such that we need all our experts for

this and other purposes. We can therefore hold out little hope

of helping you but if you wish to make a formal request we will

see what can be done.

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Brief No:

VISIT OF PRINCE ABDULLAH BIN ABDUL AZIZ

FUTURE OF BRIGADIER DONALDSON

### Background

1. Brigadier Adrian Donaldson has been Head of the British Military Mission to the National Guard for over 6 years. His present term of

service is due to come to an end in October 1974. A suitable

replacement has been provisionally selected and approved and the

incidence of other changes in the BMM's staff make this a good time for

a changeover.

2. The strong probability however is that, having established a relationship of friendship and confidence with Brigadier Donaldson,

Prince Abdullah will wish him to stay beyond October 1974. We know

that the Brigadier (who has been told that he cannot expect a Brigadiers appointment on his return to this country) would like to stay longer in Saudi Arabia and if he were offered the job on contract terms he would certainly resign and take it. Line to Take 3. The Secretary of State should raise the question of Brigadier

Donaldson's future with Prince Abdullah. He could say that we have

an excellent replacement in mind with recent command experience in

Dhofar. If the Prince indicates (as we expect he may do) that keeping Brigadier Donaldson is his price for keeping the Mission as a whole, the Secretary of State should accept this and inform the Prince we

are prepared to agree to Brigadier Donaldson's staying on as a serving

British officer. We might wish to suggest that he return for an

attachment of a month or two to brush up on current British Army practice and equipment.

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### ANNEX A

#### BRITISH MILITARY MISSION TO THE NATIONAL GUARD, SAUDI ARABIA

(Note by British Embassy, Jedda)

Since 1964 there has been a British Military Mission attached to the National Guard in Saudi Arabia. The Mission consists of a Brigadier (at present Brigadier Adrian Donaldson) and five other officers;

its HQ is in Riyadh, but one officer is detached to

Jedda. Over the years it has created for itself a position of influence and trust, and Prince Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz, commander

of the National Guard and a brother of King Faisal, has repeatedly stated that he continues to be highly satisfied with its

performance.

2. Though the Mission's position may in this sense be strong, it has not achieved very much in the way of sales of British equipment, partly no doubt because members of the Mission, in fostering their reputation for objectivity, tend to lean over

backwards not to appear to be biased towards the United Kingdom.

Partly in an effort to remedy this we submitted to Prince Abdullah some two years ago a British plan for the modernisation and re

equipment of the National Guard.

In the event the plan was

rejected, mainly, we think, because King Faisal and Prince Sultan

bin Abdul Aziz, the Minister of Defence, considered that it was

on too large a scale and would thus go too far towards changing

the balance of power between the National Guard and the Army.

However that may be, we for our part took umbrage at the manner



of the plan's rejection:

Prince Abdullah in effect threw it

back at Brigadier Donaldson with the comment that it had been

rejected "for political reasons". By the time SM Ambassador

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 115**

arrived in June 1972 communications between Prince Abdullah and

the Embassy were almost non-existent, and the Prince has since

accepted a United States plan for the piecemeal development of

the National Guard over the next ten years.

3. One element in the Embassy's relationship with the National Guard was that while we and the Ministry of Defence considered

that it was time for Brigadier Donaldson to be replaced he himself

wanted to stay on for financial reasons and Prince Abdullah also

wanted him to stay on because of their personal relationship. HM Ambassador decided that the only way in which we could

effectively begin to repair the relations between the Embassy

and Prince Abdullah was to agree that Brigadier Donaldson should

remain for another two years, and this was duly arranged with the Ministry of Defence.

4. With this as a starting point the Ambassador has been at some pains to establish a relationship with Prince Abdullah, and has had some success. The Prince commented recently that if things had been in the past as they are now everything would have been different; whether this means that a revised British plan rather than an American plan to develop the National Guard would have been accepted it is not possible to say. It remains to be

seen how much business we can get out of re-equipment recommended

by the Americans; it also remains to be seen how happily the

British Military Mission will fit into the changed scheme of

things.

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5. We have recently learned that the National Guard have set up a separate office to deal with the US project team and have told the team that they are not to work through the British Military Mission. The Americans are adamant that there will be no friction between

the team and the Military Mission but this development increases the

chances that the overall value of the Mission to us will diminish.

A complicating factor is a recurrence of the situation in

which we and the Ministry of Defence consider that Brigadier

Donaldson's secondment should not be extended while he himself still wishes to continue to serve here (and is apparently prepared

to do so on a contract basis if he could not do so with the approval

of the Ministry of Defence).

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## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 117**

Brier No.

PRINCE ABDULLAH BIN ABDUL AZIZ

Born 1921

One of the many sons of King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud the founder of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom: a half brother of King Feisal and Prince Sultan (the Minister of Defence).

Commander of the National Guard since February 1963.

He is the member of the Royal Family closest to the tribes. Abrupt, impulsive and a right-wing hard-liner but popular. He is regarded with considerable respect by the members of the British Military Mission attached to his headquarters.

A supporter of the Crown Prince Khalid. Probably personally ambitious and is likely to have a key role in determining the succession to King Feisal but he seems more likely to work for a collective leadership than to set himself up as a contender for supreme power.

Enjoys hunting trips and horse-racing and is Chairman of the Riyadh Horse-Racing Club.

Suffers from an impediment of speech. Does not speak English,

Middle East Department

Foreign & Commonwealth Office

LONDON SWI

July 1973

CONFIDENTIAL

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 118**

SECRET

UK EYES B

BRIEF NO.

VISIT OF PRINCE ABDULLAH BIN ABDUL AZIZ

SAUDI ARABIAN ARMED FORCES

General 1. The Saudi Arabian Armed Forces are small and of low efficiency despite the assistance of American and British

training and technical assistance.

They have little or no

offensive capability and only a very limited defensive capability against any major assault. They have the ability

to control the internal situation but their loyalty is an

uncertain factor which is offset only by the undoubted loyalty of the large National Guard.

Army 2. The army is organised into four independent infantry brigade groups, each having three infantry battalions and a

number of support companies. Equipment is mainly American;

nevertheless, and despite American training assistance, general

military standards are low. Promotion is slow, senior officers

are of a low calibre and the loyalty of the army as a whole is in doubt at least in the eyes of the Royal Family, which keeps the army geographically well dispersed.

National Guard

3. As a further precaution against any possible coup a large National Guard is maintained which, being recruited mainly from the Bedu tribes is loyal to the Royal Family..

SECRET UK EYES B

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The National Guard is commanded by HRH Prince Abdullah bin

Abdul Aziz, who is answerable directly to the King. It

is a force of at most 40,000 men recruited from the Loyalist

tribes of the Nejd. A third of the force, known as fedayeen and organised into 12 infantry units of up to 1,000 men each and armed with light and medium infantry weapons, is completely mobile and is stationed near the main cities and tribal centre. The remainder, less well-equipped and trained, are known as

mujahadeen and are distributed in 26 groups at centres of population throughout the country; they provide a back-up

force for the fedayeen. 4. The roles of the National Guard are:

a. To fight alongside the Army in the Defence of the Kingdom. b. To provide a force at instant readiness to maintain

law and order within the boundaries of the Kingdom. 5. Units are deployed throughout the Kingdom and are almost certainly capable of containing any local dissident threat to law and order. But it is unlikely that they could deal with a coordinated military rebellion.

Air Force

6. The air force has 49 combat aircraft (Lightnings), 34 training aircraft (BAC-167a and F-86s) which could be used in an offensive role. 10 C130 transport aircraft and some

search and rescue helicopters. Ten Hawk squadrons defend the main airfields. Twenty F5P trainers and 30 F-5E air defence fighters, 10 C-730s (including four tankers), 10 BAC-167 and more helicopters are on order. The F-5s are expected to be

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SECRET UK EYES B

delivered by the end of 1974, the Lightnings may then be

phased out.

There is also a prospect of 15 Rapier fire units

being purchased. The installation of a British early warning and control radar system is expected to be complete by early 1974, but manning difficulties are likely to inhibit full realisation of its defensive potential.

Navy.

7. The navy has three German motor torpedo boats and three American small patrol boats. It is probable that none of the latter are operational and that the former have no torpedoes. However, there is a large training programme for officers and ratings in Pakistan and it therefore seems likely that a

considerable expansion is planned.

The Saudi Arabian coastguard

is responsible to the Minister of Interior. It has a large

number of fast patrol craft and eight SRN-6 hovercraft which

give a capability only of coastal surveillance.

SECRET UK EYES B

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 121**

Brief No.

VISIT OF PRINCE ABDULLAH BIN ABDUL AZIZ : JULY 1973

Iranian Ideas for Defence Co-operation in the Gulf (Defensive)

1. Prince Abdullah may raise with the Defence Secretary the subject of Iranian ideas either for defence co-operation in

the Gulf, or for political co-operation aimed at excluding

big power rivalries from the area. Mr Khalatbary, the Iranian Foreign Minister is due to have talks about this in Riyadh with King Faisal and Omar Saqqaf from 1 - 4 July.

### **BACKGROUND**

In the last two months the Shah, in news paper inter

views and in discussion with HM Ambassador Tehran and with

the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, has laid emphasis on

the need for more co-operation between Gulf countries. His

view is that the West's dependence on oil from Gulf countries and the strategic location of the Straits of Hormuz makes the Gulf a key area, which is threatened by the Soviet Union and Iraq. Particularly since our withdrawal, the Shah considers that the regional countries must take on the task of its defence, with Iran having prime responsibility. Iran's large armament programme is justified by this view. 3. But the Shah wishes other Gulf countries to be associated with Iran in this. He first canvassed the idea of a mutual assistance pact between the Gulf countries, but the Saudis did not respond enthusiastically when it was discussed with them, and the Shah now takes the view that such a pact is currently impracticable.

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 122**

The Shah's alternative suggestion is a declaration by

the Gulf countries that great power rivalries should be excluded from the Gulf. The Iranians were concerned to discuss this proposal with us and indeed to associate HMG with it. We do not consider that such a declaration would

have any significant effect on the Soviet Union or Iraq and moreover are concerned that it could be used to embarrass us and the US because of our assistance to Oman, our personnel in the UAE and Kuwait and the US naval presence in Bahrain. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary was however able to persuade the Shah that any identification of HMG with the proposal would hinder rather than help its chances of acceptance.

Following some moves for discussion of co-operation

between some of the smaller Gulf countries the Shah now seems

ready to consider first an agreement between the Arab Gulf states, then one between them and Iran. The Shah agreed with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary that consultation with the other Gulf countries should be the next step, and the Iranians have already discussed the proposal with Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE, who are said to have agreed to it as long as all the other countries do. But Khalatbary's visit in early July will be the first Saudi-Iranian discussion of the Iranian ideas. We would expect the Saudis to be sceptical of Iran's motives, but not necessarily to oppose some sort of declaration.

/ LINE TO TAKE

- 2 -

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LINE TO TAKE

(If Prince Abdullah refers to the Shah's ideas themselves) 6. We know that the Shah is concerned about the possible Soviet or Iraqi threat to the oil assets of the Gulf States, and the key strategic location of the Straits of Hormuz. His own defence programme for Iran is based on the need for countries in the area to be able to defend themselves against such threats.

Saudi defence proposals are presumably based on similar thinking. We have noted that the Shah is concerned that countries in the area should co-operate where possible. (If Prince Abdullah refers to possible co-operation between the countries) 7. The Shah earlier publicly referred to the possibility of active defence co-operation between countries of the Gulf. Such co-operation could enhance the stability of the area,

which we would welcome, as long as any arrangement was on a

basis satisfactory to the countries concerned: Saudi Arabia's

own position would be fundamental. Does Prince Abdullah

consider that a defence co-operation arrangement, taking in both Iran and Saudi Arabia, might be feasible at some stage? (Khalatbary Visit and ideas for co-operation aimed at excluding outside powers) 8. We understand that Mr Khalatbary, the Iranian Foreign Minister was visiting Saudi Arabia between 1 - 4 July to discuss general aspects of co-operation in the Gulf. Present Iranian thinking appears to be aimed at some sort of declaration asking the great powers to stay out of the Gulf. We would

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3 -

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 124**

hope that any such measure would not hamper the ability of friendly countries like the UK to help our friends in the area. (If Prince Abdullah casts doubts on Iran's motives) 9. Our impression is that the Shah really is concerned about the threat from factors like the Soviet Union and Iraq, and that this guides all his actions. We would not expect Iran to try to push through plans and ideas involving other countries without full consultation with them and without taking account of factors important to them.

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GR 50 PRIORITY CYPHER CAT A

29 JUN 1973

RESTRICTED

NBS 26

1973

TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 516 0F/27 JUNE INFO PRIORITY JEDDA MOD.

DA'S TELNO LCS/EDQ/EBR 187: PRINCE ABDULLAH.

THE PRINCE LEFT FOR PARIS ON 27 JUNE. I SAW HIM OFF AT THE AIRPORT AND HE SEEMED WELL PLEASED WITH THE HELP WE HAD GIVEN THROUGH MY DEFENCE ATTACHE.

DEFCOMCEN PASS MOD.

WRIGHT.

[SENT TO DC C2

FILES MED DEFENCE DEPT P & C D

RESTRICTED

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 126**

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A

FROM JEDDA 2709262

CONFIDENTIAL

173. (2 NB51016 WALKER'S LETTER TO TATHAM 10/11 OF 29 MAY : NATIONAL GUARD,

1. YOU MAY WISH TO ENSURE THAT DIVERSIFIED CORPORATE SERVICES LTD ARE INFORMED OF ANY PERIODS IN THE PROGRAMME FOR PRINCE ABDULLAH BIN ABDUL AZIZ WHEN HE MIGHT BE AVAILABLE TO RECEIVE CALLS FROM PRIVATE PERSONS. OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT THE PRINCE HAS SO FAR KEPT VERY MUCH TO HIMSELF HIS THINKING ON THE PROPOSAL DIVERSIFIED CORPORATE SERVICES SUBMITTED TO HIM IN MAY.

ROTHNIE

FILES MED DEFENCE D MR PARSONS

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 127**

DIVERSIFIED CORPORATE SERVICES LIMITED

Incorporating COMMUNICATION SECURITY LIMITED

ORCHARD HOUSE, 14 GREAT SMITH STREET, LONDON SW1P 3BU



Directors: Col. A. B. PEMBERTON, MBE J. R. PILKINGTON R. ASTLEY RICHARDS,  
OBE

Telephone: 01-222 1434 Cables: Dicose London

Telex: 918934

Ref. ABP/PMW

H.K.A. Prince Abdullah Ibn Abdul Ansiz. Commander of the National Guard, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

NBS10161

Since writing to you on the 26th April we have considered various possible proposals to meet your requirement. These have taken into account such limited factors as are known to us at present about the current organisation of the National Guard as well as the limitations on offensive training imposed by this Company's charter. We believe that there are certain basic skills within the existing National Guard which could be used to create the framework for the special unit which you have in mind. We therefore feel that the most satisfactory part which we could play would be to contribute specialist training over and above that which already exists.

We envisage forming the unit from specially selected people from existing units in the National Guard who would have to have an agreed level of both physical and intellectual qualifications and who would be suitable for our training. It is suggested that this should cover the following subjects:

close escort duties. Anti ambush duties. Special security communications. Counter surveillance techniques. Endurance and survival training. Unarmed combat. Protective patrolling including night surveillance techniques. Static defence of a protected area. Observation and reporting methods.

Registered in London, Company No, 990443

**FCO 8/2125 | Page 128**

CONFIDENTIAL

Training in weapons such as mortars, machine guns, recoilless weapons as well as armoured reconnaissance training are subjects which we believe could adequately be provided from your existing resources at considerable saving in costs to yourselves. Therefore if this approach is suitable to meet your ultimate requirements our proposals will be limited to training in the subjects listed above. This should result in your having a special operations unit within which, not only will there be the basic military skills which you require but also the special skills which will make the unit a valuable addition to the National Guard.

Please be assured that we appreciate very much the honour of being invited to quote for training the National Guard and that the only reason for us suggesting this approach to you

requirement is that we will be concentrating our resources on subjects in which we are fully qualified and confident to teach, and it will at the same time save you frons becoming involved in heavy expenditure on training which could be effectively provided from within your own resources.

On receipt of your reply, Colonel A, B, Pemberton will be ready to fly at his expense to Saudi Arabia at a time convenient to you in order to see what local conditions might affect our final proposals. It would be important on this visit for him to obtain information about the current training standards and typea of equipment existing in the National Guard and to visit the site at which it is envisaged that the specialist training would take place. On return from such a viait it should be possible to submit detailed coated proposals in a very short space of time.

I have the honour to be Sir,

Your Highnesa's most humble and obedient servant,

A. B. Pemberton.

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 129**

139 / 26

EB 696/26

O MODEFCOMCEN LONDON

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RESTRICTED

TO IMMEDIATE MODUK TEL NO DIG LGA OF 26/JUN/73 (DEFCOMCEN PSE PASS)

NBS 2018 SAUDI MINISTER OF DEFENCE.

1. PRINCE TURKI TOLD ME THIS AFTERNOON THAT PRINCE SULTAN WOULD BE ASKING ME TO CALL BEFORE MY DEPARTURE ON LEAVE ON 1 JULY TO DISCUSS LORD CARRINGTON'S INVITATION TO HIM TO VISIT THE UK.

2. IT MIGHT HELP THINGS ALONG AND GENERALLY AVOID TO-ING AND FRO-ING IF WITH THE FORTHCOMING HOLIDAY SEASON IN MIND YOU COULD LET ME KNOW AT WHAT PERIODS OVER THE NEXT THREE MONTHS THE SECRETARY OF STATE WILL DEFINITELY NOT REPEAT NOT BE AVAILABLE.

ROTHNIE

NNNN

## FCO 8/2125 | Page 130

From: D Fisher DS11

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE Main Building Whitehall London SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-930 7022 ext REGISTRY No. 35

Your reference

Our reference Middle East Department Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Date

25 June 1973

I believe Tony Cragg warned you this morning of the likely requirement for a political brief for our Secretary of State for his proposed meeting with Prince Abdullah on 4/5 July.

We have now received a request for such a brief. Could you please therefore update the brief provided for the Secretary of State's visit to Saudi Arabia in April. As Tony told you, we think that additional points that will probably need to be covered are:

a. a defensive brief on the YAR's recent approaches to Qatar on arms sales and

a defensive brief on the Shah's recent pronouncements on the exclusion of Great Powers from the Gulf area.

We would be grateful for the brief by close of play Thursday 28 June.

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Yours sincerely

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## FCO 8/2125 | Page 131

Reference.....

Mr Tatham - Middle Eastern Department

Reluctant With very great reluctance I think that we must be say in Parliament, if directly asked, that exemptions from search are requested by the FCO in exceptional circumstances. I suggest therefore that two supplementaries on this point might be as follows:

Are exemptions from search ever requested by the FCO?

replied We consider the search procedures as an essential defence against the menace of hijacking. However, in very exceptional cases we are prepared to ask the airlines whether they would agree to make special arrangements. The final say rests with the airlines.

Is this practice not dangerous?

No. Careful judgement is exercised in every case and such requests are made only after the most careful consultation.

2. I attach draft supplementaries prepared by the DTI. You may think that questions one and three should be dealt with by reference to the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry and indeed any other questions on airport security. The DTI are keen that we should include supplementary 4. Indeed, you may consider that this might be the first line of defence against questions about exemption.

3. These supplementaries and the draft reply were agreed at a meeting which we held with the DTI and the Security Service.

J Dodds Marine and Transport Department

28 June 1973

cc: Miss James - P&CD

Mr Williams - NENAD Mr McDermott - PUSD

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(17293) 897465 400m 1/73 G.W.B.Ltd. Gp.863

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 132**

On what authority did BOAC allow Shaikla Omar Saqqaf on to the aircraft without being searched ?

The Government provide advice and guidance to airlines on the security measures which they might take to combat hijacking and other acts of violence, but at present the Government have no powers to give directions relating to aviation security. I Such

powers are being sought in the Protection of Aircraft Bill.

The decision to allow the Shaikh to fly was taken by BOAC and

was not a matter on which they were required to consult the Government.

( What guidance have airlines been given on the security check

ing of foreign diplomats, dignitaries and VIPs ?

Airlines have been given detailed advice on the searching

of diplomats, overseas dignitaries and diplomatic bags. But other than in the case of diplomats and crossed diplomatic bags, the treatment of which is covered by the Vienna Convention, the implementation of this advice is a matter for the decision of individual airlines. The advice which has been given is being reviewed in the light of the incident involving Shaikh

Omer Saqqaf.

Is not this a further demonstration of the need for all search ing to be carried out by police officers ?

No. The number of complaints about searching at our airports is minute. The personnel concerned in this incident were airline employees. No employees of Securicor or of any other private security organisation were involved.

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 133**

What view do the Government take about the security checking of Ministers at airports ?

Security precautions are being taken at our airports and else where throughout the world in the interests of all passengers. I believe that Ministers and dignitaries, no less then other travellers, should cooperate fully with those who have the

difficult and thankless task of searching passengers and baggage

to prevent weapons and explosives from being carried on to

aircraft.

This is the practice invariably followed by me

and my colleagues in the Government.

I realise some dignita

aries in some countries do not take the same view and in those

circumstances we must ensure that any precautions which have  
to be applied are undertaken with courtesy, tact and understanding,

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 134**

DS5 DS6

REC REGIN

Copy to: FCO (MED)

VISIT OF PRINCE ABDULLAH - COMMANDER SAUDI ARABIA NATIONAL  
GUARD

1. Prince Abdullah the Commander of the Saudi Arabian National Guard is visiting the UK next week and will be meeting S of S and Minister of State.
2. We are consulting with the FCO about political and personality briefs; and DS13 are preparing sales briefs. On defence relations I should be grateful if addressees would check the attached brief (which was prepared for SolS's visit earlier this year and let me know whether any points need updating.
3. I should be grateful for comments by noon tomorrow Friday 29 June. A telephone call will suffice.

28. Jun 73

A J CRAGG DS21 MB7365 2136MB

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## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 135**

BRIEF NO SA 5

BACKGROUND 10: The UK is very much concerned with the political/military alignment of states in the Middle East, particularly those bordering on the Gulf. However, there are no UK defence interests in Saudi Arabia and the low level of UK defence relations activities is carried out for political reasons and in consequence of sales to Saudi Arabia (See Brier SA ). NO UK Military Training Assistance Scheme (UKMTAS) allocation is made to Saudi Arabia.

Navy 2. There are no naval personnel on loan to Saudi Arabia, no students on naval courses in the UK and no bids on hand. For the first time since our withdrawal from the Gulf an RN ship visited a Saudi Arabian port this year - namely HMS ANTRIM (County Class guided missile destroyer) to Jeddah from 18 - 21 February.

Memorandum 3. A British Military Mission was established in Saudi Arabia in 1964 to advise the Saudi National Guard, a force of some 40,000 recruited from loyal tribes. The National Guard is commanded by THRI Prince Abdullah ibn Abdul Aziz who answers directly to King

declared Faisal. members of the National Guard are to fight with the enemy in defence of the Kingdom and to maintain law and order within the

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## FCO 8/2125 | Page 136

the national Guard school outside Riyadh and at Jeddah. The Mission

Tries out a variety of tasks, including:

a. Giving advice in response to requests from National Guard officers and officials.

Anticipating the problems of the National Guard.

C. Planning the modernisation and development of the National Guard.

d. Assisting and advising in the execution of military plans, procedures and transactions.

Participating in boards and committees requiring

military expertise.

'1, Arranging training courses for national Guard students in the UK and dealing with their administrative arrangements.

5. In November/December 1971, No 22 SAS trained a team of four members of the Saudi Arabian National Guard in all aspects of bodyguard instruction. The students proved to be poor material and in the time available they were unable to qualify as instructors. A further four weeks training would have been necessary to bring them up to standard and it is thought that better results might have been achieved if the Saudis had fielded a larger team; eight would have been a better number. A private. British company, Diversified Corporate Services Ltd,

score June. 6. There is one Saudi student at Staff College, Camberley. There are no students currently at PIIA Sandhurst but three have just passed out on 9 March (including Prince Tahir, the son of Prince Sultan Taha). One Saudi will be on the course starting 5 September 1973, on

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Saudi is attending an officers' Arms Survey Course, Abid is in..

hand for a Photographic Interpreters Course and we have recently

had to decline a bid for places on Forward Air Controller Courses which are fully taken up by UK requirements for the foreseeable' future,

Royal Air Force 7. Currently there are three RAT Lightning instructors on loan to Airwork in aid of the Air Defence Scheme. Negotiations are about to begin which, if successful, would result in BAC taking over from Airwork the maintenance of Saudi Lightning and Strikemaster aircraft under the umbrella of a Government to Government contract. BAC estimate that they will need about 1850 personnel in Saudi Arabia for this task. They have identified about 134 officers and airmen posts - mostly connected with Lightning servicing tasks - where they think there will be difficulty in recruiting on the civil market and which they would require to be filled by RAF loan personnel. They have asked the Air Force Department to make up this shortfall who have advised that 108 could probably be made available. There is also likely to be a requirement under the new arrangements for a resident MOD Advisory Team in Saudi Arabia, consisting of about 15 RAF personnel and civilians. There could be some difficulty over the problems arising from terms of service for RAF personnel, who will be working alongside civilians receiving pay and allowances

considerably better than UK loan service personnel in the area at :

present. The whole matter is currently being examined by the Air Force Department. If the projected sale of Jaguar goes through

support arrangements of one kind or another will probably be

required for the next ten years.

A good deal of training is provided for the RSAF under a four

year package scheme running from 1971 to the end of 1974. and linked

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to the sale to the Saudis of Lightning aircraft and Air Defence

This was a little slow in getting under way but the

RSAF is being offered as many places as possible in 1973 in order

to reduce the backlog. Their procedure for nominating candidates

is slow, involving Royal approval in each case,

9.

It is expected that the RAF will, with Saudi cooperation



meet most of its commitments under the package. There are,

however, certain problems, notably: -

a. Lightning Instrument Weapons Instructor's and Instrument -

Rating Examiners. Because of modifications to RAF Lightnings

(which cannot be shown to the Saudis) and a planned rundown

at Coltishall in 1974, it is important that this part of the package be completed in 1973. Three places for each of these courses are on offer. 6. Air Traffic Controller Training. Only four out of a quota of 30 students have so far been accepted for training. A further six nominees failed aptitude tests. In an effort to clear some of the backlog, seven places were offered for 1973. However the RSAT advised us last month that they did not require places on either: ATC or fighter controller courses this year although some might be needed in 1974. There is no hope of meeting the package total by its expiry date,

CCTU and Initial Flying Training. Some shortfall under

both these headings is likely; it is understood that the

Saudis are meeting some of their requirements at their own

King Faisal Air Academy. Among the students who are training

in the UK is Officer Cadet Bandar bin Abdullah Al-Faisal - a

grandson of the King.

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d. Qualified Flying Instructor Training. None of the twelve Jet Provost instructors due to be trained under the

package have yet completed training. Three places offered in 1972 were not taken up as were the two places allocated in 1973. The RSAF recently asked for additional Gnat CTI places which could be offset against outstanding JP places. 2 additional Gnat places have been offered for 1973 and it may prove possible to reduce, but not eliminate, the JP. backlog by further offsets in 1974. ...

10. Training under the package is being provided at subsidised

rates - approximately one-third of normal costs - the balance

being waived as an offset against R and D. levies on equipment.

sold to Saudi Arabia,

The Saudis are aware of the reduction

although not aware of the reason for it. Any shortfall under the

package will be the subject of a refund but later training will

probably have to be at full cost,

11. The RAF does not provide Operational Conversion Unit (OCU) training for

Saudi Arabian pilots. The Saudis have their own Lightning OCU and should be encouraged to perpetuate this system for Jaguar, if and

when it replaces the lightning.

i. It would be extremely

difficult for the UK to provide Jaguar OCU training for the Saudis

without detriment to RAR interests, particularly between now and

12.

There is one student at the RAF Staff College Bracknell -

Prince Bandar bin Feisal bin Abdul Aziz - a son of the King.

Eight officer Cadets are attending clerk/secretarial courses and

33 Warrant officers are attending Aircraft Mechanic courses.

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### **CAKING NOTES**

attention to our current defence relationship and look forward to

fruitful co-operation. You may wish to say that we welcome the

presence of Saudi Arabian students on courses in the UK - particularly members of the Royal Household. The programme of training provided for the RSAF seems to be going quite well but we would be grateful for Saudi co-operation in nominating course students as early as possible.

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CONFIDENTIAL

26 Office of the Military Attaché

BRITISH EMBASSY

JEDDA

68/13

Protocol Office Ministry of Defence London SWI

### **VISIT OF COMMANDER OF NATIONAL GUARD**

1. No doubt you will be preparing various briefs for the Secretary of State against the official visit to the UK of the Commander of the Saudi Arabian National Guard, Prince Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz. You may find it helpful as a contribution to have the enclosed short brief we have written in the Embassy on the British Military Mission to the National Guard.

2. Against the background provided in the brief, we in the Embassy would see two linked purposes in the organisation of an official visit for Prince Abdullah. First, the visit is part of a general process of our trying to get on to better terms with him. Secondly, in terms of possible arms sales, the visit is an exercise in casting bread upon the waters, all the more desirable because the French, in inviting the Prince to pay an official visit to France, obviously consider that it is worth their while to try to get in on the act.

3. With reference to paragraph 5 of the brief, our Head of Chancery has written separately to Bill Adler to say that he hopes to see Brigadier Donaldson on 24 June.

RG Woodhouse Lieutenant Colonel

Military Attaché cc: Lt Col WML Adler OBE

Middle East Dept, FCO MOD (D Sales 1) MOD (Adviser on Loan Service Policy)

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### **BRITISH MILITARY MISSION TO THE NATIONAL GUARD, SAUDI ARABIA**

1.

Since 1964 there has been a British Military Mission attached

to the National Guard in Saudi Arabia. The Mission consists of a Brigadier (at present Brigadier Adrian Donaldson) and five other officers; its HQ is in Riyadh, but one officer is detached to Jedda. Over the years it has created for itself a position of

influence and trust, and Prince Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz, Commander

of the National Guard and a brother of King Faisal, has repeatedly stated that he continues to be highly satisfied with its

performance.

Though the Mission's position may in this sense be strong, it has not achieved very much in the way of sales of British equipment, partly no doubt because members of the Mission, in

fostering their reputation for objectivity, tend to lean over

backwards not to appear to be biased towards the United Kingdom. Partly in an effort to remedy this we submitted to Prince Abdullah

some two years ago a British plan for the modernisation and re equipment of the National Guard. In the event the plan was rejected, mainly, we think, because King Faisal and Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz, the Minister of Defence, considered that it was on too large a scale and would thus go too far towards changing the balance of power between the National Guard and the Army. However that may be, we for our part took umbrage at the manner of the plan's rejection: Prince Abdullah in effect threw it back at Brigadier Donaldson with the comment that it had been rejected "for political reasons". By the time HM Ambassador

/arrived

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arrived in June 1972 communications between Prince Abdullah and

the Embassy were almost non-existent, and the Prince has since

accepted a United States plan for the piecemeal development of

the National Guard over the next ten years.

3. One element in the Embassy's relationship with the National Guard was that while we and the Ministry of Defence considered that it was time for Brigadier Donaldson to be replaced he himself wanted to stay on for financial reasons and Prince Abdullah also

wanted him to stay on because of their personal relationship.

HM Ambassador decided that the only way in which we could effectively begin to repair the relations between the Embassy and Prince Abdullah was to agree that Brigadier Donaldson should remain for another two years, and this was duly arranged with the Ministry of Defence.

4. With this as a starting point the Ambassador has been at some pains to establish a relationship with Prince Abdullah, and has had some success. The Prince commented recently that if things had been in the past as they are now everything would have been different; whether this means that a revised British plan

rather than an American plan to develop the National Guard would

have been accepted it is not possible to say. It remains to be

seen how much business we can get out of re-equipment recommended by the Americans; it also remains to be seen how happily the British Military Mission will fit into the changed scheme of things.

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A complicating factor is a recurrence of the situation in which we and the Ministry of Defence consider that Brigadier Donaldson's secondment should not be extended while he himself still wishes to continue to serve here (and is apparently prepared to do so on a contract basis if he could not do so with the approval of the Ministry of Defence).

British Embassy Jedda 23 June 1973

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## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 145**

E.R. D/PROT/556/110

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 35

NBS26

DS 11 PS/Mors PS/USofS (Army) Sec/CNS PS/HDS PS/The Rt. Hon. Lord Balniel AUS(D Staff) Comdt, RAC Centre Comat, School of Infantry AMD/HDS RMA Sandhurst (Lt Col Rees-Webbe) Brigadier Major, HQ Household Division CO Household Cavalry Regiment DPO(G) PR2 SAASC(Lt Col Bromage) The Queen's Flight (Mr. Oakes) Mov Ops (RAF) MDS3 FCO, MED (Mr. Danders) GHT (Mr. Nudd, Mr. Johnston & Mr. Norman)

VISIT OF PRINCE ABDULLA

1. I attended a meeting at the Saudi Arabian Embassy this morning at which the following arrangements were agreed. Those present

Mr. J. Dander, TCO

Lt. Colonel Sutro, Protocol and myself.

2. A list is attached of the agreed official visitors. The visitors will be accommodated at the Dorchester Hotel and FCO have agreed to finance No. 11. A number of additional visitors are expected and the Saudi Arabian Embassy agreed that they would accept responsibility for making all the arrangements for them, including accommodation and transport.

3. Time of Arrival This will be at 1110A on Wednesday, 4 July, at Heathrow by Flight SV.7899 (Saudi Arabian Airlines Boeing 707, special flight). H.E. The Saudi Arabian Ambassador will be present and several members of the Embassy will also be there to greet Prince Abdulla on arrival.

4. H.E. Sheikh Abdulrahman Al-Helaissi, GCVO, the Saudi Arabian Ambassador, and Lieutenant-Colonel T.N. Bromage, OBE, (Escort/Interpreter) will accompany throughout the visit. The FCO are also arranging for Mr. P. Bannerman of the Research Department or another, if not available, to interpret at the luncheons on 4th, 5th, 6th and 9th and the dinner on 5th July. It was agreed that he should sit behind and to the right of the host and the Ambassador on Prince Abdulla's right.

5. The following visitors will accompany Prince Abdulla on all the visits:

2, 3, 6 & 7.

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 146**

E.R. 6 & 7 will not, however, take part in calls and discussions.

They will also be present at all the social functions, and, in addition, numbers 4, 5 & 8 will be invited to the Secretary of State's dinner on 5 July.

6. Dress Uniform will be worn by serving officers for the arrival and visit to Household Cavalry Regiment on 4 July and on 6 July for the visit to Larkhill, and on 9 July for the visit to RMA Sandhurst. For Sois' dinner the dress is either Black Tie or National Dress.

29 June 1973

E.W.BRIGGS Captain RN Protocol Officer Room 8336 Ministry of Defence Main Building  
Whitehall LONDON SW 1 Tel: 01-930-7022 Extension: 6608

PS: Saudi Arabian Press & TV Representatives

Mr. John Dander agreed to investigate the possibility of FCO PR looking after these visitors.

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 147**

APPENDIX TO D/PROT/556/110 dated 29th June 1973

1. 11.R.H. Prince Abdulla bin Abdulaziz, Commander of the National Guard.
2. H.E. Shaikh Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Iuhsein Al-Tuwaijiri, Under Secretary of the National Guard for Financial & Administrative Affairs"
3. Lieutenant-General Ibrahim Al-Rashia, Military Commander of the National Guard.
14. Shaikh Khalid bin Muhammad bin Shalub, Director of the Commander's Office for Financial and Military Affairs.
5. Mr. Hamad bin Salih Al-Hamudi, Director of the Commander's Office. 6. Captain Sultan bin Khalil, Commander of the National Guard Special Security Unit. 7. First Lieutenant Faisal bin Abdul Muhsin Al-Furm, Deputy Commander National Guard Police Unit.
- Dr. Khalil Ahmad Tibu, Personal Physician. Ahmad bin Talib, Personal Companion.
- 9.
10. Abdul Rahman Al-Shatri, Deputy Director of Public Relations for the National Guard.
11. Muhi Ibrahim Al-Maghrabi, National Guard Photographer.

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 148**

Protocol Office, Room 8336, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE Main Building Whitehall London SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-930 7022 ext 7227

Your reference

Salem Azzam Esq., CVO, Counsellor, Saudi Arabian Embassy, 27 Eaton Place, LONDON SV1X 8B

Our reference

D/PROT/556/110 Date 28 June 1973

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS PRINCE ABDULLA bin ABDULAZIZ

I attach the programme which we have submitted to the printers. You will appreciate the urgency of finding out when Prince Abdulla arrives and departs and I would ask you to take active measures to find this out.

I understand that there is a possibility of a meeting with the Ambassador on Monday, 2nd July to establish who will accompany Prince Abdulla on the various occasions. Mr. Tatham of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office is arranging this.

## FCO 8/2125 | Page 149

D/PROT/556/110 GHF Nuda)

Copies to: PS/sofs PS/MOIS PS/USofS(Army) Sec/CNS MA/VCDS MA/VCGS PS/HDS PS/The Rt. Hon. Lord Balniel, MP, FCO AUS(D Stari) Commandant, RAC Centre Commandant, School of Artillery AMD/HDS RMA Sandhurst (Col. Rees-Webbe) Brigade-Major, HQ Househola Division CO, Household Cavalry Regiment CPR PR2 DPO(G) SAASC (Lt. Col. Bromage) Queen's Flight (Mr. Oakes) PS12(A) Mov Ops (RAF) MDS3 FCO, Middle East Dept (Mr. Tatham) ICO, Information Administration Dept.

(Mr. Jones) Special Branch (Inspector Tompkins) HQ Sy 5b OS5b Chief Office Keeper

HRH PRINCE ABDULLA bin ABDULAZIZ 1. Attached is the programme approved by the Secretary of State for Defence.

The details are firm except for: a. Time of arrival by "Special Aircraft" from Paris on

Wednesday, 4th July. 11.10 local

Time of departure on the morning of 10th July. I

The names of those accompanying Prince Abdulla. The total party is believed to be eleven but an earlier signal mentioned thirteen, GMF will

The names of the visitors who will accompany Prince Abdulla on the visits mentioned in the programme.

## FCO 8/2125 | Page 150

VISIT OF

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS PRINCE ABDULLA bin ABDULAZIZ

COMMANDER OF THE SAUDI ARABIAN NATIONAL GUARD

4 to 10 JULY 1973

## FCO 8/2125 | Page 151

3.

in very effort is being made to clarify these details.

4. The security classification regarding the visit is removed now that the programme is agreed.

J.L. SUTRO Lieutenant-Colonel Assistant Protocol



Officer Room 8336, MOD, Main Building, Whitehall, SW1 Tel: 01--930-7022 Extension: 7227

28 June 1973

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 152**

His Royal Highness Prince Abdulla bin Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia will accompanied by:

(Details at present not known other than there will be 10 persons · including Saudi Arabian Ministry of Information officials)

In attendance:

Lieutenant-Colonel T.N. Bromage, OBE, Grenadier Guards

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 153**

PROGRAMME

WEDNES

, 4 JULY

HE

His Royal Highness will arrive at London (Heathrow) Airport by Special Flight from Paris.  
(Details of arrival time and terminal not known at present)

سقفس

Met by:

The Right Honourable Lord Carrington KCMG, MC,

Secretary of State for Defence

Lieutenant-colonel T.N. Bromage, OBE, Escort Officer/

Interpreter

Leave London Airport (for Dorchester Hotel if time allows.)

Depart Dorchester Hotel for Hyde Park Barracks, Knights bridge if time allows.)

Arrive at Hyde Park Barracks, Knightsbridge. Met by Lieutenant-Colonel W.R, Edgedale, Life Guards, Commanding officer, The Household Cavalry Regiment, and introduced to the officers.

Luncheon.

1 315 1410

Visit the Riding School Gallery. See full dress display in the Gymnasium, visit the Forge, visit the Life Guards and The Blues and Royals Squadrons.

Depart for the Dorchester Hotel.

15 30 1630

The Right Honourable Lord Ba Iniel, MP, Minister of State, The Foreign and Commonwealth Office, calls on His Royal Highness.

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 154**

THURSDAY, 5 JULY

1100

Depart the Dorchester Hotel.

Arrive The Ministry of Defence, Horse Guards Avenue, . Welcomed by The Right Honourable Lord Carrington, KCMG, MC, Secretary of State for Defence, and The Right Honourable Ian Gilmour, MP, Minister of State for Defence. Received by a Guard of Honour provided by the 1st Battalion Welsh Guards with the Regimental Colour Corps of Drums and the Band of the Battalion,

1130 1235

Talks with The Right Honourable Ian Gilmour, MP, Minister of State for Defence.

1240

Depart The Ministry of Defence, Horse Guards Avenue Entrance for Admiralty House.

Luncheon given by Her Majesty's Government Host: The Right Honourable Ian Gilmour, MP, Minister of State for Defence.

Depart Admiralty House and return to the Ministry of Defence.

1430

Talks with Admiral Sir Michael Pollock, GCB, MVO, DSC, ADC, Chief of the Naval Staff and First Sea Lord, and Major-General W.N.R. Scotter, OBE, MC, Director of Military Operations.

1505 1605

Talks with the Secretary of State for Defence

1610 1640

Talks with Sir Lester Suffield, Head of Defence Sales.

Depart Ministry of Defence.

1700

Arrive the Dorchester Hotel. 2455 1955 Depart the Dorchester Hotel for Lancaster House.  
2200 2000 Dinner given by Her Majesty's Government. for

Host: The Right Honourable Lord Carrington, KCMG, MC, 2245 zols Secretary of State for Defence. Dress: Black Tie or National Dress.

PB Return to the Dorchester Hotel.

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 155**

FRIDAY, 6 JULY

0950

Depart the Dorchester Hotel accompanied by Brigadier R.K. Purvis, MBE, Assistant Military Deputy to the Head of Defence Sales.

1020

Arrive Battersea Heliport.

1030

Depart Battersea Heliport by Queen's Flight for the Royal School of Artillery, Larkhill, Wilts.

Arrive Larkhill Met by Brigadier K.J. McQueen, Commandant Royal School of Artillery.

1130. 1215

See demonstration of Fox and Scorpion given by Colonel J.R. Willis, Acting Commandant Royal Armoured Corps Centre,

1220

Fly by Queen's Flight to Royal Artillery Officers' Mess.

Luncheon in Royal Artillery Officers' Mess. s AB

1245 1400

14415 1530

Presentation on Rapier given by Colonel H.M. Garnett.

Depart by queen's Flight for Battersea Heliport.

1535 1620

Arrive Battersea Heliport.

1700

Arrive Dorchester Hotel.

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 156**

SATURDAY, 7 JULY

Free.

SUNDAY

8 JULY

MONDAY, 9 JULY

0945

Depart Dorchester Hotel accompanied by Mr. Peter Blaker, MP, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Defence for the Army.

1100

Arrive Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, Yorktown Gate. Met by Brigadier J.T. Page, OBE, MC, acting Commandant.

Briefing in Arabic on the Royal Military Academy. A tour of the Academy including a visit to the Assault Course.

1240 1400

Luncheon.

A further tour of the Academy to see Cadets undergoing instruction including a Weapon Display.

1500

Depart for the Dorchester Hotel,

1615

Arrive Dorchester Hotel.

1800

Attends reception given by Mr. Salem Azzam, CVO, Charge D'Affaires Saudi Arabian Embassy at Claridges.

TUESDAY, 10 JULY

His Royal Highness departs.

( Details at present not known.)

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 157**

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Reference

RECEIVED

NBS2 VISIT OF PRINCE ABDULLAH

I spoke yesterday to Lt Colonel Sutro (MOD MB6608) who is handling the arrangements for the visit of Prince Abdullah, Commander of the Saudi National Guard.

2.

The tentative programme is as follows: Wednesday, 4 July: Morning:

arrive London Airport, met by Lord

Carrington. Thursday, 5 July: call on Mr Gilmour (Minister of State

MOD).

Lunch with Mr Gilmour.

Afternoon:

call on Lord Carrington

Call of Head of Defence Sales.

Dinner given by Lord Carrington in honour of Prince Abdullah.

Friday, 6 July:

Present plans are for a visit to Bovington to see armoured fighting vehicles.

3

..

We might consider suggesting that Lord Balniel \* should call on Prince Abdullah on the afternoon of 4 July.

21 June 1973

DE Tatham Middle East Department

Mr Skilbeck, Defence Dept

RESTRICTED

(17293) Dd.897465 400m 1/73 G.W.B.Ltd. Gp.863

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 158**

FCO 597/1

-4/26

LEB 621/20

REGISTRY No. 35

PP DEFCONCEN

GRS 250

NBS 2018

CYPHER CAT A PM JEDDA 20131ØZ JUNE CONFIDENTIAL

MOD DISTRIBUTION

TO PRIORITY MODUK TELNO DIG LCS/EDQ/EER OF 20/6/73.

YOUR EDQ/EBR OF 19145øZ: VISIT OF PRINCE ABDULLAH,

1. IN ADDITION TO A PRESENTATION ON FOX AND SCORPION WE CONSIDER THAT HRH SHOULD ALSO BE GIVEN A PRESENTATION ON RAPIER, HE HAS ALREADY EXPRESSED INTEREST IN HALF A BATTERY IN DISCUSSIONS WITH WOODHEAD AND CANTON OF BAC AND THIS MIGHT BE A GOOD OPPORTUNITY FOR BAC TO MAKE A FUSS OF HIM, FOLLOWING THE AM: CABLE SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEMS OVER VIGILANT,

2. PRINCE ABDULLAH'S SON, PRINCE MIT'AB BIN ABDULLAH BIN ABDUL AZIZ, AND ISA BIN IBRAHIM AL RASHID, SON OF THE MILITARY COMMANDER OF THE NATIONAL GUARD (LT GENERAL IBRAHIM AL RASHID, WHO IS ACCOMPANYING PRINCE ABDULLAH) HAVE BEEN ALLOTTED VACANCIES AT RMA SANDHURST IN 1974. BOTH ARE AT PRESENT RECEIVING LANGUAGE TRAINING I UK, WE RECOMIEND THAT PRINCE ABDULLAH SHOULD BE INVITED TO VISIT SANI HURST.

3. WE HAVE OF COURSE ASKED THE NATIONAL CUARD WHETHER THERE ARE 17 EMS THAT PRINCE ABDULLAH HIMSELF WOULD WISH TO HAVE INCLUDED IN HIS PROCRAME BUT HAVE RECEIVED THE (TYPICALLY ARAD) RESPONSE THAT THE CONTENTS OF THE PROGRAMME ARE ENTIRELY UP TO US.

4. AS TO LENGTH OF THE PROGRAME WE RECOMMEND THAT IT SHOULD NOT IS 6 DAYS). WE ALSO RECOMMEND THAT EARLY MORNING STARTS SHOULD BE AVOIDED.

DEFCOMCEN PASS PRIORITY LUDUK

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 159**

REGISTRY N. 35

NBS 2618

7489

FCO 491/E45/20

MOD DISTRID

LEB 613/2\$

PP DEFCOMCEN

GRS 5ø

CYPHER CAT A FM JEDDA 29655Z JUNE CONFIDENTIAL

TO PRIORITY MODUK TEL NO DIG LCS OF 20/6/73.

YOUR DIG LCS OF 181557Z AND MY LGA/LCS OF 29065øZ JUNE: VISIT OF PRINCE ABDULLAH

1. CHOICE OF LONDON HOTEL IS LEFT TO US. THE IMPORTANT THING IS THAT THE HOTEL SHOULD BE APPROPRIATE TO THE BROTHER OF KING FAISAL, AND SHOULD BE OF THE SAME ORDER OF GRANDEUR AS THOSE STAYED IN BY PRINCE SULTAN AND PRINCE FAHD.

DEFCOMCEN PASS PRIORITY MODUK.

NNNN

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 160**

99 PRIORITY CYPHER CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY 1..35

AM BEIRUT 260828Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO LCS/EDQ/EBR 187 OF 26 JUNE 1973 AND PRIORITY  
MOD UK INFO PRIORITY JEDDA.

FROM BRITDEFAT BEIRUT.

VISIT OF PRINCE ABDULLAH, FCO TEL 338 OF 22 JUN.

1. YOUR PROPOSED PROGRAMME HAS BEEN SUBMITTED TO PRINCE  
ABDULLAH AND HE HAS AGREED TO IT. HE HAS NO COMMENTS EXCEPT THAT  
HE WOULD LIKE THE WEEK END 7/8 JULY TO REMAIN FREE AS YOU SUGGEST.

2. THE PARTY WILL NUMBER ELEVEN MADE UP OF THE OFFICIAL PARTY OF  
SEVEN PLUS FOUR OTHERS INCLUDING MINISTRY OF INFORMATION  
OFFICIALS.

3. THE PARTY WILL TRAVEL BY SPECIAL AIRCRAFT AND THE TIMES OF  
ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE WILL BE ARRANGED LATER BETWEEN THE SAUDI  
EMBASSIES IN PARIS AND LONDON.

DEFCOMCEN PASS MOD UK.

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION MED DEFENCE D P & CD MOD INTERNAL

COPIES TO:

PS/LORD CARRINGTON MOD CAPT CW BRIGGS RN (PROTOCOL MOD) MR  
PATERSON GOVERNMENT HOSPITALITY

FUND

CONFIDENTIAL

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 161**



Reference.

Mr Jones - IAD

#### VISIT OF PRINCE ABDULLAH OF SAUDI ARABIA RECEIVEDINI

1. The Commander of the Saudi National Guard, Prince Abdullah, has been invited to visit this country by Lord Carrington and is arriving on 4 July. Government Hospitality Fund are dealing with most of the expenses but gibbed at the size of the Prince's party and only agreed to pay for 10 of them. This leaves one photographer from the National Guard and two Saudi News Agency officials out in the cold.

2. I am very reluctant to go back to the Saudis and ask them to pay for this accommodation themselves. Prince Abdullah was personally invited by Lord Carrington and the National Guard is an important potential customer for British defence equipment. In addition we have had a military mission with the Guard for nearly 10 years.

3. To avoid spoiling the ship for a ha'p'orth of tar I should be grateful if IAD could consider meeting the accommodation costs of these three while they are in London. If you think you will be able to take this on could you please liaise with it. Col. Sutro, Ministry of Defence, Main Building, Extension 6608.

DE Tatham Middle East Department

22 June 1973

/

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## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 162**

TOP COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

GR46 PRIORITY CYPHER CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

1973 TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 285 og 23/6 INFO PRIORITY MOD (FOR PS TO S OF S) AND PRIORITY BEIRUT (DEFCOMCEN PSE PASS MOD ADDRESSEE).

YOUR TEL TO BEIRUT NO 338 : VISIT OF PRINCE ABDULLAH,

1. THIS SEEMS SPLENDID, THE ONLY COMMENT I HAVE TO OFFER IS THAT, AS I THINK YOU KNOW, THE PRINCE (LIKE THE SAUDI AMBASSADOR IN LONDON) IS VERY KEEN ON HORSES, THE WEEKEND MIGHT BE ARRANGED WITH THIS IN MIND,

ROTHNIE

[SENT TO DCC)

FILES

MED DEFENCE DEPT NEWS DEPT NENAD PRIVATE SECRETARY PS/LORD  
BALNIEL MR PARSONS MR ROSE

COPIES TO PS/LORD CARRINGTON, MOD CAPT. BRIGGS

MOD DS 11

MOD MR PATERSON, GOVT. HOSP. FUND

CONFIDENTIAL

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 163**

GR70 PRIORITY EN CLAIR

FROM JEDDA 230818Z

UNCLASSIFIED

TO PRIORITY FCO TÉL 284 OF 23/6AB INFO PRIORITY BEIRUT,

YOUR TEL NO 334TO BEIRUT, PARA 2: VISIT OF PRINCE ABDULLAM.

1. FORECAST OF PARTY OF EIGHT GIVEN IN MY TEL NO DIG LGA/LCS OF  
200650Z TO MODUK WAS AMENDED TO EIGHT PLUS FIVE IN MY TEL NO DIG  
LCS OF 201306Z TO MODUK (NOT REPEATED).

2, THE THIRTEEN NAMES GIVEN IN MY TEL NO DIG LCS / EDQ/EBR OF 216869Z  
WERE AS GIVEN US OFFICIALLY BY NATIONAL GUARD,

ROTHNIE

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION MED DEFENCE DEPT PCD MOD INTERNAL

COPIES TO

PS/LORD CARRINGTON

CAPT BRIGGS, PROTOCOL, MOD.

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 164**

PRIORITY GRS 250

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A

(NBS 26/3)

FM F C O 221655Z

CONFIDENTIAL

73 TO PRIORITY BEIRUT TELNO 338 OF 22 JUNE/INFO PRIORITY JEDDA. JEDDA TELEGRAMS LCS/EDQ/EBR OF 20 AND 21 JUNE. VISIT OF PRINCE ABDULLAH, FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY TO DEFENCE SECRETARY, 1. THE PROPOSED PROGRAMME FOR SUBMISSION TO PRINCE ABDULLAH IS AS FOLLOWS: 4 JULY PRINCE ARRIVES BETWEEN 1100 AND 1200., MET BY LORD CARRINGTON AT HEATHROW. DRIVES TO LONDON. LUNCHES WITH HOUSEHOLD CAVALRY REGIMENT, KNIGHTSBRIDGE, AFTERNOON : TOUR OF BARRACKS. 5 JULY ON ARRIVAL AT MINISTRY OF DEFENCE AT 1115, MET BY LORD CARRINGTON AND MR AN GILNOUR, MINISTER OF STATE. SIISPECTS GUARD OF HONOUR. TALKS WITH MINISTER OF STATE. LUNCHES WITH MINISTER OF STATE. AFTERNOON: TALKS WITH A CHIEF OF STAFF, HEAD OF DEFENCE SALES, AND SECRETARY OF STATE. EVENING: GOVERNMENT DINNER IN PRINCE'S HONOUR HOSTED BY SECRETARY OF STATE. 6 JULY MORNING: TRAVELS BY QUEEN'S FLIGHT AIRCRAFT TO SEE DEMONSTRATION OF FOX AND SCORPION VEHICLES AT LARKHILL. LUNCH IN MESS. AFTERNOON : SEES RAPIER (BAC REPRESENTATIVES MAY BE PRESENT). LIKELY TO BE ACCOMPANIED THROUGHOUT THE DAY BY GENERAL COOPER, DIRECTOR OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE, AND COLONEL BROMAGE, ESCORT OFFICER ( WHOM PRINCE KNOWS) FROM THE MOD. RETURNS TO LONDON BY QUEEN'S FLIGHT AIRCRAFT. 7 AND 8 JULY FREE, SIGHTSEEING COULD BE ARRANGED IF PRINCE'S WISHES ARE KNOWN. ALTERNATIVELY WEEKEND COULD BE LEFT FREE FOR SAUDI EMBASSY IN LONDON TO MEET PRINCE'S REQUIREMENTS, ACCORDING TO USUAL PRACTICE. 9 JULY VISITS RMA SANDHURST AND LUNCHES THERE. 10 JULY END OF OFFICIAL VISIT. DEPARTS.

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

2. SUITABLE ACCOMMODATION IS BEING BOOKED INCLUDING SUITE FOR PRINCE, WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF CONFUSION OVER NUMBERS IN PARTY FOR LONDON VISIT CAN BE CLARIFIED, EARLIER FORECAST OF EIGHT TRAVELLERS IS AT VARIANCE WITH LATER NOMINAL LIST OF THIRTEEN, NUMBERS TRAVELLING TO LARKHILL AND SANDHURST MUST IN ANY CASE BE RESTRICTED. 3. EARLY DETAILS OF ARRIVAL TIME ON 4 JULY AND LIKELY DEPARTURE TIME ON 16 JULY, TOGETHER WITH COMMENTS ON REMAINDER

OF PROGRAMME WOULD BE APPRECIATED AS SOON AS AVAILABLE SINCE TIME FOR RE-ARRANGEMENT IS LIMITED.

DOUGLAS-HOME DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION MED DEFENCE D P & C D MOD INT

PS/LORD CARRINGTON MOD CAPT EW BRIGGS RN PROTOCOL MCI MR PATERSON G H F

2. CONFIDENTIAL

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 166**

E.R.

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT F.C.O. TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

TO : BEIRUT INFO: JEDDA

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY TO DEFENCE SECRETARY. VISIT OF PRINCE ABDULLAH. JEDDA TELEGRAMS-LESTEDQ/EBR OF

1.

THE PROPOSED PROGRAMME FOR SUBMISSION TO PRINCE

ABDULLAH IS AS FOLLOWS:

4 JULY

PRINCE ARRIVES BETWEEN 1100 and 1200. MET

BY LORD CARRINGTON AT HEATHROW. DRIVES TO

LONDON. LUNCHES WITH HOUSEHOLD CAVALRY REGIMENT,

KNIGHTSBRIDGE.

5 JULY

AFTERNOON: TOUR OF BARRACKS. ON ARRIVAL AT MINISTRY OF DEFENCE AT 1115, MET BY LORD CARRINGTON AND MR. IAN GILMOUR, MINISTER OF STATE. INSPECTS GUARD OF HONOUR. TALKS WITH

MINISTER OF STATE. LUNCHES WITH MINISTER OF STATE.

AFTERNOON : TALKS WITH A CHIEF OF STAFF, HEAD OF  
DEFENCE SALES, AND SECRETARY OF STATE.

EVENING: GOVERNMENT DINNER IN PRINCE'S HONOUR  
HOSTED BY SECRETARY OF STATE.

6 JULY

MORNING: TRAVELS BY QUEEN'S FLIGHT AIRCRAFT TO

SEE DEMONSTRATIONS OF FOX AND SCORPION VEHICLES AT LARKHILL.  
LUNCH IN MESS. AFTERNOON: SEES RAPIER. (BAC REPRESENTATIVES MAY BE  
PRESENT). LIKELY TO BE ACCOMPANIED THROUGHOUT THE DAY BY  
GENERAL COOPER, DIRECTOR OF MILITARY

ASSISTANCE, AND COLONEL BROMAGE, ESCORT OFFICER  
(WHOM PRINCE KNOWS) FROM THE M.O.D. RETURNS TO

CONFIDENTIAL

/ London

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 167**

CONFIDENTIAL

E.R.

CONFIDENTIAL

LONDON BY QUEEN'S FLIGHT AIRCRAFT.

7 & 8 JULY FREE. SIGHT-SEEING COULD BE ARRANGED IF PRINCE'S  
WISHES ARE KNOWN. ALTERNATIVELY WEEKEND COULD  
BE LEFT FREE FOR SAUDI EMBASSY IN LONDON TO  
MEET PRINCE'S REQUIREMENTS, ACCORDING TO USUAL  
PRACTICE.

9 JULY

VISITS R.M.A. SANDHURST AND LUNCHES THERE.

10 JULY

END OF OFFICIAL VISIT. DEPARTS.

SUITABLE ACCOMMODATION IS BEING BOOKED INCLUDING SUITE  
FOR PRINCE. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF CONFUSION OVER NUMBERS  
IN PARTY FOR LONDON VISIT CAN BE CLARIFIED. EARLIER FORECAST  
OF EIGHT TRAVELLERS IS AT VARIANCE WITH LATER NOMINAL LIST  
OF THIRTEEN. NUMBERS TRAVELLING TO LARKHILL AND SANDHURST  
MUST IN ANY CASE BE RESTRICTED.

3.

EARLY DETAILS OF ARRIVAL TIME ON 4 JULY AND LIKELY  
DEPARTURE TIME ON 10 JULY, TOGETHER WITH COMMENTS ON  
REMAINDER OF PROGRAMME WOULD BE APPRECIATED AS SOON AS  
AVAILABLE SINCE TIME FOR RE-ARRANGEMENT IS LIMITED.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 168**

CONFIDENTIAL

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING, WHITEHALL, LONDON, S.W.1

SECRE

CRETARY O

TELEPHONE WHITEHALL 7022

OF STATE

Covering CONFIDENTIAL

MO 25/8

RECEIVED IN

22nd June, 1973,35

REGIS

NB 826

VISIT OF PRINCE ABDULLAH

I should be grateful if you could arrange for the dispatch of a telegram to Beirut along the lines of the enclosed draft reacting to the telegrams received on this subject over the last two days.

Malcolm

(M. DUNMORE)

David Tatham, Esq.

pur sepa CONFIDENTIAL

**FCO 8/2125 | Page 169**

CONFIDENTIAL

MMEDIATE CYPHER CAT A

REGISTRY NO,75

FROM JEDDA 219745Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE MODUK TEL NO DIG LCS/EDQ/EBR OF 21/6/73 INFO ROUTI NE  
FCO AND BEIRUT AND SAVING TO PARIS.

(DEFCOMCEN PSE PASS MODUK)

FCO TEL NO 221 AND MY LCS/EDQ/EBR OF 20131øZ (NOT TO ALL I VISIT OF  
COMMANDER OF NATIONAL GUARD,

1. IN THE LENGTHY NEGOTIATIONS WE HAD TO CONDUCT IN ORDER TO  
SATISFY THE SENSITIVITIES OF PRINCE ABDULLAH BIN ABDUL AZIZ WE WERE  
OBLIGED TO STATE THAT LORD CARRINGTON "WOULD" GIVE AN OFFICIAL  
BANQUET IN THE PRINCE'S HONOUR ON THE EVENING OF THE SECOND DAY  
OF HIS OFFICIAL VISIT TO THE UK, I.E. 5 JULY. NATURALLY | VERY MUCH  
HOPE THAT THIS CAN IN FACT BE PROVIDED FOR IN THE PROGRAMME.

2. ! ALSO HAD TO SAY THAT I WOULD ASK MOD TO TRANSMIT TO THE PRINCE VIA OUR AND THE SAUDI EMBASSIES IN BEIRUT (WHERE HE WILL BE FROM TODAY. UNTIL HE LEAVES FOR PARIS ON 27 JUNE) THE PROGRAMME FOR HIS VISIT. AND I SHOULD ACCORDINGLY BE GRATEFUL IF AT LEAST THE FULLEST OUTLINE POSSIBLE COULD BE TELEGRAPHED THERE (COPIED TO US) AS SOON AS YOU CAN MANAGE. I TRUST THAT THIS WILL NOT INVOLVE MUCH DIFFICULTY FOR HM AMBASSADOR BEI RUT, I TOLD PRINCE ABDULLAH THAT SHOULD HE HAVE ADJUSTMENTS TO SUGGEST TO THE PROGRAMME I SHOULD BE PREPARED, IF IT WOULD BE USEFUL, TO SEND A MEMBER OF MY STAFF TO BEIRUT TO DISCUSS THEM WITH HIM, AND I AM SO PREPARED (RELUCTANTLY, OF COURSE.

13. THE NATIONAL

CONFIDENTIAL

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 170**

CONFIDENTIAL

3. THE NATIONAL GUARD IN THEIR TURN HAVE UNDERTAKEN TO LET YOU KNOW THROUGH OUR EMBASSY IN BEI RUT THE TIME OF PRINCE ABDULLAH'S ARRIVAL IN LONDON ON 4 JULY, WHICH THEY HAVE SAID WILL BE BETWEEN 11,90 AND 12,90 NOON.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING TO PARIS,

ROTHNIE

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

FILES M E D DEFENCE DEPT NEWS DEPT N E NAD PCD PRIVATE SECRETARY  
PS/LORD BALNIEL MR PARSONS MR ROSE

COPIES TO PS/LORD CARRINGTON MOD. CAPT BRIGGS MOD. P.S. CAPT BRIGGS  
MOD MR PATTERSON, GOVT. HOSPITALITY FUND DS DI MOD

-2 CONFIDENTIAL

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 171**

GR275

FROM JEDDA 2108øZ

TOCOPY

UNCLASSIFIED



TO ROUTINE MODUK TEL DIG LCS/EDQ/EBR OF 21/JUN/73 INFO FCO AND BEIRUT AND SAVING PARIS. (DEFCOMCEN PSE PASS MODUK).

MY TELNO LCS OF 201300Z : VISIT OF COMMANDER OF NATIONAL GUARD.

FOLLOWING ARE NAMES AND TITLES OF MEMBERS OF PRINCE ABDULLAH'S PARTY.

1. HRH PRINCE ABDULLAH BIN ABDUL AZIZ, COMMANDER OF THE NATIONAL GUARD. 2. HE SHAIKH ABDUL AZIZ BIN ABDUL MUHSIN AL-TUWAIJIRI, UNDER SECRETARY OF THE NATIONAL GUARD FOR FINANCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE AFFAIRS. 3. HE LIEUTENANT GENERAL IBRAHIM AL-RASHID, MILITARY COMMANDER OF THE NATIONAL GUARD (FORMALLY DEPUT UNDER SECRETARY OF THE NATIONAL GUARD FOR OPERATIONAL AFFAIRS). 4. MR (USTADH) KHALID BIN MUHAMMAD BIN SHALUB, DIRECTOR OF THE COMMANDER'S OFFICE FOR FINANCIAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS. 5. MR HAMAD BIN SALIH AL-HAMUDI, DIRECTOR OF THE COMMANDER'S OFFICE 6. CAPTAIN SULTAN BIN KHALIL, COMMANDER OF THE NATIONAL GUARD SPECIAL SECURITY UNIT. 7. FIRST LIEUTENANT FAISAL BIN ABDUL MUHSIN AS-FURM, DEPUTY COMMANDER NATIONAL GUARD POLICE UNIT. 8. DR KHALIQ AHMAD TIBU, PERSONAL PHYSICIAN. 9. AHMAD BIN TALIB, PERSONAL SERVANT.

10. ABDUL

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 172**

10. ABDUL RAHMAN AL-SHATRI, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC RELATIONS FOR THE NATIONAL GUARD. 11. MUHT IBRAHIM AL-MAGHRABI, NATIONAL GUARD PHOTOGRAPHER. 12. HASAN AL-AMRI, SAUDI NEWS AGENCY (TV). 13. ADIL HASAN HADI, DITTO.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING PARIS.

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED) :

FILES

MED

COPIES TO

DEFENCE DEPT

PS/LORD CARRINGTON MOD

NEWS DEPT

CAPT BRIGGS

MOD

NENAD

HEAD. DS 11

MOD

P &

C D

MR PATTERSON GOVT HOSP. FUND

PRIVATE SECRETARY

PS/LORD BALNIEL

MR PARSONS

MR ROSE

-2

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 173**

EN CLAIR

FROM JEDDA 210815Z

UNCLASSIFIED

TO ROUTINE MODUK TEL NO DIG LCS OF 21/JUN/73 AND INFOFCO AND BEIRUT AND SAVING PARIS,(DEFCOMCEN PSE PASS MODUK).

MY TEL NO DIG LGA/LCS OF 200650Z (NOT TO ALL) : VISIT OF COMMANDER OF NATIONAL GUARD,

1. THE SAUDI NEWS MEDIA ANNOUNCED YESTERDAY EVENING THAT "IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INVITATION CONVEYED FROM HIS EXCELLENCY THE BRITISH MINISTER OF DEFENCE TO HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS PRINCE ABDULLAH BIN ABDUL AZIZ, COMMANDER OF THE NATIONAL GUARD, TO VISIT BRITAIN FROM 4 JULY, HRH WILL UNDERTAKE A VISIT TO BRITAIN DIRECTLY AFTER THE END OF HIS VISIT TO FRANCE",

FCO PSE PASS SAVING PARIS.

ROTHNIE

[SENT TO DCC] (REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

FILES MED DEFENCE D NEWS D NENAD P & C D PS

PS/LORD BALNIEL MR PARSONS MR ROSE

COPIES TO:

PS/LORD CARRINGTON MOD CAPT BRIGGS MOD DS 11 MOD MR PATTERSON  
GOVT HOSPITALIT

FUND

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 174**

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 35

FCO 318/E34/19

LEB 61/19

ZZ DEFCOMCEN

ZZ FCO

UNEDITED COPY "ADVANCE COPYMEX (fils)

GR87

CYPHER CAT A

FROM JEDDA 1998152

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FLASH MODUK TEL NO LHA EDQ OF 19 JUN 73 AND TO 'FLASH INFO FCO.

MY TELS NOS 170800Z JUN AND RTT 189640Z JUN PRINCE ABDULLAH.

FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY TO DEFENCE SECRETARY.

1. MAVIN G RECEIVED NO REPLY TO MY TELS. UNDER REFERENCE I HAD NO CHOICE THIS MORNING BUT TO ATTEMPT TO POSTPONE MY MEETING WITH THE PRINCE. HIS DEPUTY REPLIED THAT IN VIEW OF THE TIGHTNESS OF ABDULLAH'S TIMETABLE (HE IS NOW APPARENTLY LEAVING FOR BEI RUT TOMORROW) THIS WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE.

2. HOWEVER, I CAN PRESUMABLY GET AT HIM LATER TODAY, IF NECESSARY BY TELEPHONE.

3. GRATEFUL FOR REPLY BY FLASH TELEGRAM

ROTHNIE

NNNN

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 175**

COVERINGCONFIDENTIAL

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING, WHITEHALL, LONDON, S.W.1

SECRE

RETARY OF

TELEPHONE WHITEHALL 7022

OF STATE

COVERING CONFIDENTIAL MO 25/8

18th June 1973

PRINCE ABDULLAH'S VISIT

I would be grateful if you could arrange for a telegram on the lines of the attached draft to be despatched to Jedda.

Malcolm Sunmore (M. DUNMORE) RECHVED IN

REGISTRY No.34

D. Tatham, Esq.

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 176**

CONFIDENTIAL

E.P

DRAFT-TELEGRAM-FROM-FCO TO JEDDA CONFIDENTIAL DIG RTT of 18 0640 2/  
Your tel to MODUK :/ visit of Prince Abdullah. From Private Secretary to Defence  
Secretary. 1. Your signals of 17th and 18th June refer

to the arrangements for greeting Prince Abdullah.

Condom Airport Lord Carrington plans to meet him at LAP on arrival on 4th July as long as this is no later than 12.30 pm. In conveying this to the Prince, please let him know that the Secretary of State always intended to greet

him on arrival if he could, but that s of S's other

commitments will prevent them having further personal

discussions until the afternoon of the next day, when he also hopes to entertain him in the evening. Additionally Lord Carrington has instructed that a full and interesting

programme be drawn up for the Prince during the rest

of his stay.

2. For your own information Lord Carrington was due to be out of the country from 2 - 5th July inclusive on

another overseas visit until this was postponed at the

end of last week.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 177**

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 160630Z IMMEDIATE CYPHER CAT A

TOP COPY.

FM FCO 1516352

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 1606307 TO IMMEDIATE JEDDA TEL NO 217 OF 15 JUNE 1973 YOUR TEL TO MODUK EDG/EBR: VISIT OF PRINCE ABDULLAH, FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY TO DEFENCE SECRETARY. LORD CARRINGTON HAS SEEN YOUR SIGNALS EDQ/EBR OF 13 JUNE AND 14 JUNE. ALTHOUGH IT IS A DIFFICULT TIME FOR S OF S, HE AGREES PRINCE ABDULLAH SHOULD BE INVITED TO COME ON TO ENGLAND FROM FRANCE AND THAT A SUITABLE PROGRAMME SHOULD BE ARRANGED. LORD CARRINGTON HIMSELF WILL BE UNABLE TO SEE OR ENTERTAIN THE PRINCE UNTIL JULY 5, BUT CONSIDERS THIS NEED NOT DELAY HIS ARRIVING ON JULY & WE WILL SUGGEST A DETAILED PROGRAMME FOR CONSIDERATION IN DUE COURSE.

DOUGLAS-HOME

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION MED DEFENCE DEPT MOD INTERNAL

COPIES TO CAPTAIN BRIGGS MOD (PROTOCOL) PS/LORD CARRINGTON MOD  
GOVT. HOSPITALITY FUND

CONFIDENTIAL

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 178**

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

E.R

DRAFT FCO TELEGRAM TO JEDDA

VISIT OF COMMANDER OF NATIONAL GUARD

From Private Secretary to Defence Secretary.

Lord Carrington has seen your signals EDQ/EBR of 1324458 June and 1414 June. Although it is a difficult

time for S of s, he agrees Prince Abdullah should be  
invited to come on to England from France and that a  
suitable programme should be arranged.

Lord Carrington himself will be unable to see or  
entertain the Prince until July 5, but considers this  
need not delay his arriving on July 4. We will suggest  
a detailed programme for consideration in due course.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 179**

GRS IMMEDIATE CYPHER/CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

(NB)

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FLASH JEDDA TELEGRA. I NUMBER 221 OF 19 JUNE 73.

YOUR TEL TO MODUK DIG RTT OF 1826402 : VISIT OF PRINCE ABDULLAH,  
FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY TO DEFENCE SECRETARY.

1. YOUR SIGNALS OF 17 AND 18 JUNE REFER TO THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR GREETING PRINCE ABDULLAH, LORD CARRINGTON PLANS TO MEET HIM AT LONDON AIRPORT ON ARRIVAL ON 4 JULY AS LONG AS THIS IS NO LATER THAN 12.30 PM. IN CONVEYING THIS TO THE PRINCE, PLEASE LET HIM KNOW THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE ALWAYS INTENDED TO GREET HIM ON ARRIVAL IF HE COULD, BUT THAT S OF S'S OTHER COMMITMENTS WILL PREVENT THEM HAVING FURTHER PERSONAL DISCUSSIONS UNTIL THE AFTERNOON OF THE NEXT DAY, WHEN HE ALSO HOPES TO ENTERTAIN HIM IN THE EVENING. ADDITIONALLY LORD CARRINGTON HAS INSTRUCTED THAT A FULL AND INTERESTING PROGRAMME DE DRAWN UP FOR THE PRINCE DURING THE REST OF HIS STAY,

2. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION LORD CARRINGTON WAS DUE TO BE OUT OF THE COUNTRY FRO.1 2-5 JULY INCLUSIVE ON ANOTHER OVERSEAS VISIT UNTIL THIS WAS POSTPONED AT THE END OF LAST WEEK.

DOUGLAS-HOME

FILES MED DEFENCE D NEWS D NENAD PS PS/LORD BALNIEL MR PARSONS MR ROSE

COPIES TO:

PS TO LORD CARRINGTON MOD CAPT BRIGGS MOD DS 11

MOD MR PATERSON GOVERNMENT HOSPITALITY

FUND

CONFIDENTIAL

**FCO 8/2125 | Page 180**

GRS 160

CONFIDENTIAL AMENDED DISTRIBUTION (19 JUNE 23)

JEDDA 189640Z JUNE .. CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE MODUK TELNO DIG'RTT OF 180640Z JUNE, 1973 INFO ROUTINE FCO.

MY TEL NO 170890Z: PRINCE ABDULLAH.

FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY TO S OF S.

1. TWO OFFICERS OF OUR MISSION TO THE NATIONAL GUARD TOOK LUNCH WITH PRINCE ABDULLAH YESTERDAY AND TOLD ME AFTERWARDS THAT HE WAS HUFFING AND PUFFING A BIT ABOUT THE UNCERTAINTIES SURROUNDING HIS RECEPTION IN LONDON.

2, THIS IS, OF COURSE, ONLY ONE DEGREE LESS IRRITATING TO ME THAN IT MUST BE TO YOU, BUT AS WE ALL KNOW, OUR ARAB GUESTS SET GREAT STORE BY APPEARANCES, CLEARLY, HOWEVER, EVEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE CANNOT CONTRIVE TO BE IN TWO PLACES AT ONE TIME AND, IF IT COMES TO IT, IT WOULD HELP ME TO SMOOTH ABDULLAH'S FEATHERS TOMORROW IF I CAN DEMONSTRATE THAT LORD CARRINGTON HAS A LONG-STANDING ENGAGEMENT EL SEWHERE (AND PREFERABLY A LONG WAY FROM LHR).

3. THE FRENCH MILITARY ATTACHE, HEARING OF OUR IMBROGLIO, SUGGESTED TO ME THAT IF IT WOULD HELP THEY COULD SHIP THE PRINCE TO CANNES FOR A FEW DAYS' PRIVATE STAY AFTER HIS OFFICIAL VISIT TO PARIS. THIS WILL ! FEAR NOT WORK AS ABDULLAH IS SET ON (A) COMING STRAIGHT ON TO LONDON AND (B) MORE IMPORTANT, BEING SEEN TO RECEIVE WHAT HE CHOOSES TO REGARD AS PARITY OF TREATMENT WITH HIS SENIOR BROTHERS. DEFCOMCEN PASS IMMEDIATE DESKBY 180900Z MODUK

ROTHNIE

FILES MED DEFENCE D P & C D NEWS D

PS MR PARSONS MR LE QUESNE

CONFIDENTIAL

**FCO 8/2125 | Page 181**

CONFIDENTIAL AMENDED DISTRIBUTION (19 JUNE 73)

CYPHER/CAT A

GPS 400

170800Z

CONFIDENTIAL DESKBY 180800Z



TO IMMEDIATE MODUK TEL NO 17080øZ PSE PASS/ ANDINFO FCO.

0F17/6.(DEFCOMCEN

MY TEL NO DIG EDQ/EBR OF 1415457 AND FCO TEL NO 217 : VISIT OF PRINCE ABDULLAH

FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY TO DEFENCE SECRETARY,

1. UNFORTUNATELY PRINCE ABDULLAH, THROUGH HIS DEPUTY, HAS TAKEN UP THE FIRM POSITION THAT IF LORD CARRINGTON PERSONALLY CANNOT MEET HIM AT LONDON AIRPORT ON 4 JULY THEN HE MUST POSTPONE INDEFINITELY HIS VISIT TO THE UK. ONE FACTOR BEHIND THIS RIGID STANCE IS UNDOUBTEDLY THAT THE PRINCE IS BEING MET BY THE FRENCH MINISTER OF DEFENCE AT PARIS ON 27 JUNE : I HAVE ACCORDINGLY CONSIDERED IT WORSE THAN POINTLESS TO TRY TO ARGUE (AS POSSIBLY I MIGHT HAVE DONE IN OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES) THAT THE COMMANDER OF THE NATIONAL GUARD, ALTHOUGH A BROTHER OF THE KING, IS NOT AFTER ALL THE EQUIVALENT OF A MINISTER OF DEFENCE AND OUGHT TO BE SATISFIED TO BE MET BY A JUNIOR MINISTER, PRINCE ABDULLAH IS NOT PREPARED TO CONSIDER SPENDING 4 JULY IN EITHER FRANCE OR THE UK IN A PRIVATE CAPACITY.

2. ONE CANNOT ADMIRE PRINCE ABDULLAH FOR BEING PREPARED TO FOREGO THE SUBSTANCE OF A VISIT ON A POINT SO OBTUSELY PROTOCOLA! RE. BUT EQUALLY IT WOULD BE A PITY ON THAT ACCOUNT TO LOSE A HARD WON OPPORTUNITY (MY TEL UNDER REF) THAT WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO RECUR FOR AT LEAST SOME MONTHS, I VENTURE TO ASK THEREFORE, WHETHER, IF PRINCE ABDULLAH'S TIME OF ARRIVAL AT HEATHROW WERE TO BE BETWEEN 1100 A.M.AND 1,00 P.M., AS HIS DEPUTY HAS INTIMATED IT WOULD BE, LORD CARRINGTON'S PROGRAMME COULD BE ADJUSTED TO ALLOW HIM TO MEET HIM PERSONALLY.

CONFIDENTIAL

**FCO 8/2125 | Page 182**

CONFIDENTIAL

3. I HAVE AN APPOINTMENT WITH THE PRINCE AT 11,39 LOCAL TIME (Ø8302) ON TUESDAY ( HE WILL BE LEAVING FOR BEIRUT ON THURSDAY), AND SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR A RESPONSE TO THIS TELEGRAM BY CLOSE OF PLAY MONDAY,

4. WHETHER OR NOT THE SECRETARY OF STATE COULD MEET PRINCE ABDULLAH BETWEEN THE HOURS INDICATED, IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF IN YOUR RESPONSE YOU WOULD INCLUDE, FOR USE AT MY DI SCRETION, A NOTE OF HIS APPOINTMENTS ON 4 JULY,

5. I MIGHT ADD THAT THE PRINCE'S DEPUTY WAS IN ADDITION INCLINED TO ARGUE THAT ANY PROGRAMME FOR THE PRINCE MUST PROVIDE FOR AN OFFICIAL BANQUET ON THE FIRST DAY, I THINK WE WERE SUCCESSFUL IN PERSUADING HIM THAT ACCORDING TO BRITISH PROTOCOL IT WAS NOT NECESSARY FOR SUCH A FUNCTION TO BE HELD ON THE FIRST DAY. THAT THE POINT WAS RAISED AT ALL, HOWEVER, GIVES A FURTHER INDICATION OF PRINCE ABDULLAH'S SENSITIVITY TO THE NICETIES OF PROTOCOL (AS HE SEES THEM).

ROTHNIE

FILES MED DEFENCE D P & C D NEWS D

PS MR PARSONS MR LE GUESNE

-2

CONFIDENTIAL

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 183**

TOP COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A

FROM JEDDA 199815Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FLASH MODUK TEL NO LHA EDQ OF 19 JUN 73 AND TO FLASH INFO FCO,

MY TELS NOS 170800Z JUN AND RTT 189646Z JUN PRINCE ABDULLAH,

FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY TO DEFENCE SECRETARY,

1. MA VING RECEIVED NO REPLY TO MY TELS. UNDER REFERENCE I MADE NO CHOICE THIS MORNING BUT TO ATTEMPT TO POSTPONE MY MEETING WITH THE PRINCE, HIS DEPUTY REPLIED THAT IN VIEW OF THE TIGHTNESS OF ABDULLAH'S TIMETABLE (HE IS NOW APPARENTLY LEAVING FOR BEJRUT TOMORROW) THIS WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE.

2. HOWEVER, I CAN PRESUMABLY GET AT HIM LATER TODAY, IF NECESSARY BY TELEPHONE.

3. GRATEFUL FOR REPLY BY FLASH TELEGRAM.

ROTHNIE

[SENT TO DCC]

FILES MED DEFENCE D P & C D NEWS D

PS

MR PARSONS MR LE QUESNE

CONFIDENTIAL

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 184**

RESTRICTED

IMMEDIATE CYPHER CAT A GPS 55 AM JEDDA 200650Z JUNE RESTRICTED

20 JUN 19/13

TO IMMEDIATE MODUK TELNO DIG LGA/LCS OF 20/6/73, INFO IMMEDIATE FCO.

FCO TELNO 221: VISIT OF COMMANDER OF NATIONAL GUARD

1. I AM GLAD TO SAY THAT PRINCE ABDULLAH CONVEYED MESSAGE TO US LAST NIGHT THAT HE WOULD ARRIVE AT LONDON AIRPORT BEFORE 1230 PM ON: 4 JULY.

2I BELIEVE THE PRINCE 'S PARTY WILL TOTAL EIGHT, INCLUDING HIS PERSONAL DOCTOR. NAMES WILL FOLLOW, AS WILL SUGGESTIONS TOWARDS PROGRAMME.

DEFCOMCEN PASS IMMEDIATE MODUK. \*\*

ROTHNIE

[SENT TO DCC]

FILES

MED DEFENCE D NEWS D NENAD PS PS/LORD BALNIEL MR PARSONS MR ROSE

COPIES TO:

PS/LORD CARRINGTON MOD CAPT BRIGGS MOD. DS11 MOD MR PATTERSON  
GOVT HOSPITALITY FUND

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## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 185**

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING, WHITEHALL, LONDON, S.W.1

SECRET

TELEPHONE WHITEHALL 7022

ETARY OF

F STATE

CONFIDENTIAL

15th June 1973

MO 25/8

We spoke about my Secretary of State's reaction to the suggestion that Prince Abdullah might make an official visit to this country early in July immediately after his visit to France.

I should be grateful if, as agreed, you would send a telegram on the lines of the attached draft in answer to our Ambassador's signals received during the last two days.

your smicerely,

Malcolm (M DUNMORE)

David

Tatham Esq..

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

**FCO 8/2125 | Page 186**

SECRETA

STATE

WITH

THE COMPLIMENTS OF THE

PRIVATE SECRETARY

MAIN BUILDING, WHITEHALL

LONDON, S.W.1

## FCO 8/2125 | Page 187

SECRETARY

OF STATE

Copies to:

PS/MINISTER OF STATE\* PSO/CDS\* PS/CE(PE) \* DUS (P)\* HDS AUS (D Staff) \* AUS (Sales) HEAD OF DS 11\* HEAD OF DS 13\* SECCOS\* AD/Sales 1(d) Mr. Tatham, MED FCO.

(\* with attachment)

CONFIDENTIAL

MO 25/8

PROTOCOL OFFICER

VISIT OF H.R.H. PRINCE ABDULLAH OF SAUDI ARABIA

Your minute D/PROT/556/110 asked for advice on a suggestion that Crown Prince Abdullah might shortly take up Lord Carrington's invitation that he should visit this country.

2. The Secretary of State has considered the question and following a further signal from our Ambassador in Jedda (copy attached) has decided that the Prince should be officially invited to spend a few days in England.

3. Lord Carrington will be unable to see him until the afternoon of July 5th, and proposes to have a meeting with him then and follow this up with some entertainment that evening. He does not however feel that this need prevent us accepting Abdullah as from July 4th and hopes that a suitable programme can be arranged for him, perhaps lasting from Wednesday 4th July until the weekend. He would be grateful if the Minister could see Abdullah on the morning of Thursday 5th July and perhaps host a lunch for him that day. Sales and equipment visits could be fitted in around this MOD part of the visit.

4. The FCO are dispatching a telegram to Jedda confirming that Lord Carrington accepts the timing of the visit, and promising a draft programme for consideration. I should be grateful if, after consultation with all concerned, you could let me have an outline programme for transmission to our Ambassador.

(M. DUNMORE) APS/SECRETARY OF STATE 930, 7022 Ext: 2111/3

18th June, 1973. CONFIDENTIAL

## FCO 8/2125 | Page 188

TOP COPY

RECONFIDENTIAL CYPHER CAT A

NBS1016 CONFIDENTIAL

1973 TO IMMEDIATE MODUK TEL NO DIG/EDQ/EBR OF 69/6/AND REPEATED FOR INFO TO FCO AND PARI S( DEFCOMCEN PASS TO MODUK).

YOUR DIG EDQ EBR OF 0616152 (NOT REPEATED) , VISIT OF PRINCE ABDULLAH,

1. NATIONAL GUARD CONVEYED TO US TODAY MESSAGE THAT PRINCE ABDULLAH BIN ABDUL AZIZ. SENDS HIS GREETINGS TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE, THAT HE WILL BE VISITING FRANCE FROM 27 JUNE TO 3 JULY, AND THAT IF IT IS CONVENIENT TO LORD CARRINGTON HE WOULD LIKE TO TAKE UP HIS INVITATION TO PAY AN OFFICIAL TO THE UK DIRECTLY THEREAFTER.

2. WE UNDERTOOK TO CONSULT YOU AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.

ROTHNIE

F I LES DEFENCE D WED MED MR ROSE MR WIGGIN MR PARSONS

CONFIDENTIAL

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 189**

CONFIDENTIAL Reference\_

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference.

MR. HUNT

MR HUNT

RECEIVED IN

POSSIBLE VISIT BY PRINCE ABDULLAH

1.

Mr Wright's minute of 6 June below.

2. I have spoken again to Mr Candler. He tells me that the Sudanese Chief of Staff is likely to be looked after by a Brigadier (? Berger).

3. He took the point that, if Prince Abdullah were to come, It. Col. Bromage might assist but a more senior man would have to take the lead in escorting him.

4. My reading of the attached telegram from Jedda, number DIG EDO/EBR of 6 June, is that the possibility of an early visit by the Prince is perhaps receding. MOD will keep in touch.

I JR Dando Middle East Department

7 June 1973

ENC

(17293) Dd.897465 400m 1/73 G.W.B.Ltd. Gp.863

CONFIDENTIAL

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 190**

Reference.... CONFIDENTIAL

29 May in connection with a possible visit to Paris by Banten am 8.,

Prince Abdullah, Commander of the Saudi National Guard.

at which Mr MacDonald expressed some surprise. I have subsequently explained to him that the telegram was sent at the request of the DTI (I think it is important, incidentally, that we ensure that the DTI do not get their lines crossed with MOD Sales on this question). I have today told Mr MacDonald of the terms of Jedda's reply (telno 258).

2. Mr MacDonald said that he had heard from Adnan Khashoggi that Prince Abdullah was definitely coming to Paris early next week, and MOD Sales were therefore wondering whether they should arrange for Prince Abdullah to be taken on a firing demonstration at Bovington. He asked for my advice on whether the presence of the Sudanese Chief of Staff and the Iranian Defence Attaché would cause any problems. I said that it would not by itself and that the only essential condition so far as the nationality of others at the demonstration was concerned was that no Israelis should be present. Mr MacDonald confirmed that this condition was met.

3.

I went on further to say that it was most important that Prince Abdullah should be properly received and escorted. It emerged from Mr MacDonald's account that the intention had been that the VCGS, who has agreed to escort the Sudanese Chief of Staff, would also look after Prince Abdullah. I pointed out that there was a risk that Prince Abdullah would appear to be no more than an appendage to the party, and said that I thought it important that the MOD should try to find someone of sufficiently senior status to look after Prince Abdullah alone.

I also suggested to Mr MacDonald that Lord Carrington should be personally informed of any arrangements for Prince Abdullah since, as you know, Lord Carrington has issued an invitation to Prince Abdullah to pay an official visit to this country.

5. I should be grateful if Mr Dando could have a word with the DTI about the point in para 1 above.

P R H Wright Middle East Department

4 June 1973

cc: Defence Department

(17293) 897465 400m 1/73 G.W.B.Ltd. Gp.863 NENAD

CONFIDENTIAL

## **FCO 8/2125 | Page 191**

ADVANCE COPY DEFENCE DEPT. ©

PP DEECOM CEN

RR FCO

GRS 158

CYPHER GAT A IM JEDDA 9608252 JUNE CONFIDENTIAL

TO PRIORITY MODUK TELNO DIG EDQ/EBR OF 6/6/73, INFO ROUTINE FCO.

YOUR DIG EDQ/EBR OF \$417337 (NOT TO FCO)SCORPION AND FOX

FOR AD/SALES 1(D)

1. GIVEN THAT WE KNOW THAT PRINCE ABDULLAM IS CONSIDERING WHEN HE CAN ACCEPT LORD CARRINGTONS INVITATION TO PAY AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO THE UK (OUR TELO 953 OF 2 JUNE TO FCO, NOT REPEATED TO YOU), WE ARE RELUCTANT TO INTERVENE TO SUGGEST AN UNOFFICIAL VISIT, PARTICULARLY SINCE IT SEEMS YOU MIGHT HAVE DIFFICULTY IN LAYING ON A PROPER DEMONSTRATION IF 8-9 JUNE DID TURN OUT TO BE THE DATES FOR THE PRINCE'S VISIT TO FRANCE

2. PRINCE ABDULLAH HAS, WE BELIEVE, BEEN HAVING ENOUGH TROUBLE PERSUADING KING FAISAL TO ALLOW HIM TO VISIT FRANCE, AND I DO NOT WISH TO RISK EMBARRASSING HIM OR OURSELVES BY PRESSING HIM TO TAX THE KING'S INDULGENCE FURTHER.

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
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
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There is a direct correspondence between the number of the "The National" to which the letter is addressed, in order to find some cases of which appear very similar.

47

10. The same is particularly proved by the fact that the same conditions are observed in the same cases.

11. The same is also proved by the fact that the same conditions are observed in the same cases.

12. The same is also proved by the fact that the same conditions are observed in the same cases.

48

There is a direct correspondence between the number of the "The National" to which the letter is addressed, in order to find some cases of which appear very similar.

10. The same is particularly proved by the fact that the same conditions are observed in the same cases.

11. The same is also proved by the fact that the same conditions are observed in the same cases.

12. The same is also proved by the fact that the same conditions are observed in the same cases.

49

There is a direct correspondence between the number of the "The National" to which the letter is addressed, in order to find some cases of which appear very similar.

10. The same is particularly proved by the fact that the same conditions are observed in the same cases.

11. The same is also proved by the fact that the same conditions are observed in the same cases.

12. The same is also proved by the fact that the same conditions are observed in the same cases.

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[illegible]

*The [unclear]  
[unclear] O'Neil - [unclear]  
[unclear] all - the [unclear]  
[unclear]*

*J.H. Danks  
9/2/80. msl  
ms B.107.*

[illegible]

**QUESTIONNAIRE**

**NAME OF STUDENT:** \_\_\_\_\_

**NAME OF SCHOOL:** \_\_\_\_\_

**DATE:** \_\_\_\_\_

**QUESTIONS:**

- Q1. What is a **monomial**?
- Q2. What is a **binomial**?
- Q3. What is a **trinomial**?
- Q4. What is a **polynomial**?
- Q5. What is a **linear equation**?
- Q6. What is a **quadratic equation**?
- Q7. What is a **cubic equation**?
- Q8. What is a **quartic equation**?
- Q9. What is a **quintic equation**?
- Q10. What is a **sixth degree equation**?

**THANK YOU**



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




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QUESTION 4

1. Explain the difference between the following:

(a) Intermittent and continuous reinforcement

(b) Primary and secondary reinforcement

ANSWER 4

1. Intermittent reinforcement is a schedule where the subject receives reinforcement only on some of the responses. Continuous reinforcement is a schedule where the subject receives reinforcement on every response.

(a) Intermittent reinforcement is a schedule where the subject receives reinforcement only on some of the responses. Continuous reinforcement is a schedule where the subject receives reinforcement on every response.

(b) Primary reinforcement is a stimulus that has a natural reinforcing value. Secondary reinforcement is a stimulus that has acquired a reinforcing value through association with a primary reinforcer.

QUESTION 5

1. Explain the difference between the following:

(a) Intermittent and continuous reinforcement

(b) Primary and secondary reinforcement

ANSWER 5

1. Intermittent reinforcement is a schedule where the subject receives reinforcement only on some of the responses. Continuous reinforcement is a schedule where the subject receives reinforcement on every response.

(a) Intermittent reinforcement is a schedule where the subject receives reinforcement only on some of the responses. Continuous reinforcement is a schedule where the subject receives reinforcement on every response.

(b) Primary reinforcement is a stimulus that has a natural reinforcing value. Secondary reinforcement is a stimulus that has acquired a reinforcing value through association with a primary reinforcer.

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19. Welche der folgenden Aussagen sind zutreffend? (2P)

Die Aussage ist für jeden Prozess an einem beliebigen Punkt und für  
 einen beliebigen Prozess zum Zeitpunkt  $t_0$  zutreffend, wenn  
 die folgenden Aussagen gelten:

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
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
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
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


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1. A marketing leader is a consequence of the structure he chose to put the leaders of reformulating their negative behavior's assessment should not be concerned with the limited ability to continue to create jobs (and be successfully engaged in the use of a limited body of the work and in the case the company, of the industry of technology).

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
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Description